## 1AC

### 1AC

A diferentes países los

Certifican los gringos

No quieren que exista droga

Pues dicen que es un peligro

¿Díganme quien certifica

A los Estados Unidos?

Para agarrar a los narcos

México a sido derecho.

Los gringos compran la coca

La pagan a cualquier precio.

No quieren que exista droga

Pero se dan privilegios

Different countries are

Certified by the gringos

They do not want drugs there

For they say that is a danger

Tell me who certifies

The United States?

To catch the narcos

Mexico has been straight.

The Americans buy coke

They pay it at any price.

They do not want drugs to exist

But give themselves privilege

(from “El General” by Los Tigres del Norte, translation in “Criminals and enemies? The Mexican drug trafficker in official discourse and in narcocorridos” by Alejandro Lajous)

#### US attitude toward drugs is captured here by Los Tigres del Norte. Foreign supply is a threat, but domestic demand is a lost cause; while little is done to curtail consumption, the centerpiece of US engagement toward Mexico is characterized by militarized surveillance and violent suppression to combat drug trafficking. Any deviance from the status quo is perceived as a threat – the only option is the perpetuation of Calderon’s “war”

Freidersdorf, 13

staff writer at The Atlantic, where he focuses on politics and national affairs (Conor, “Mexico Is Ready to End Failed Drug-War Policies—Why Isn't the U.S.?,” The Atlantic, 30 April 2013, <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/04/mexico-is-ready-to-end-failed-drug-war-policies-why-isnt-the-us/275410/)//bghs-BI>

Did you know that the U.S. has been operating surveillance drones in Mexico, providing air support for the Mexican military, tracking the movements of Mexican citizens, sharing state-of-the-art spy technology with Mexican officials, and sending CIA agents to help Mexico train drug informants? Did you know the DEA has more employees stationed in Mexico than any of its other foreign posts? That Mexican nationals trained and bankrolled by the CIA raid Mexican drug cartels? Or that the CIA runs high-tech "fusion centers" in Mexico City, Monterrey and elsewhere? "For the past seven years, Mexico and the United States have put aside their tension-filled history on security matters to forge an unparalleled alliance against Mexico's drug cartels, one based on sharing sensitive intelligence, U.S. training and joint operational planning," Dana Priest reports in the Washington Post. "But now, much of that hard-earned cooperation may be in jeopardy." Enrique Pena Nieto, Mexico's new leader, reportedly dislikes the status quo, and was shocked, on taking office this December, at the degree of United States involvement in his country. The article is worth reading in full. What I can't help but remark upon is the way that it handles the spectacular failure of the War on Drugs. It notes "mounting criticism" that any success fighting cartel leaders has also helped to incite "more violence than anyone had predicted, more than 60,000 deaths and 25,000 disappearances in the past seven years alone." Put another way, the period of maximum American involvement has coincided with a horrific spike in drug-related violence. "Meanwhile," Priest continues, "the drug flow into the United States continued unabated. Mexico remains the U.S. market's largest supplier of heroin, marijuana and methamphetamine and the transshipment point for 95 percent of its cocaine." So the strategy was high cost, low reward. It increased violence and did nothing to reduce the drug supply. Yet the fact that it completely failed plays basically no role in the rest of the article, in large part because everyone in the United States government apparently wants to preserve the failed status quo. American officials are very upset that Mexico's new leader has decided to go his own way. Look at the very next sentences: No one had come up with a quick, realistic alternative to Calderon's novel use of the Mexican military with U.S. support. But stopping the cartel violence had become Peña Nieto's top priority during the campaign. The U.S. administration didn't know what that meant. Some feared a scaling back of the bilateral efforts and a willingness to trade the relentless drive against cartel leaders for calmer streets. Does anyone else think that "a willingness to trade the relentless drive against cartel leaders for calmer streets" just might be "a quick, realistic alternative to Calderon's novel use of the Mexican military with U.S. support"? At the very least, it surely it doesn't make sense to presume, as the article seems to, that the obviously failed status quo is the most "realistic" way forward. Sticking with it is arguably delusional. But that angle is seemingly never pursued. As ever, the utter failure of American drug policy is taken by the establishment as evidence that persisting is of even more importance. The policies the United States pursued in Mexico as part of our increased role there coincided with a huge uptick in violence and no reduction in the supply of Mexican drugs? By God, let's hope that the Mexicans don't decide to try something completely different! It's the most irrational status-quo bias you're likely to find. Given that Mexicans are the ones dealing with the dead bodies in the current arrangement, little wonder that they're able to appreciate the irrationality more than America's mystifyingly persistent drug warriors. Drugs can have awful affects all on their own. What's even worse are black markets in drugs. There's only one way to end them in a free country. And policymakers aren't open to it, despite the fact that ending prohibition would weaken the cartels more than anything. So the carnage continues.

#### Since the 70s, the “war on drugs” has proven a failed initiative, yet it endures; the US-Mexico border has developed into a space of exception where law is suspended by the sovereign

Parker, 11 – master’s degree in cultural and political studies from Royal Holloway, University of London, written extensively in the academic arena on geopolitics, ‘radical’ politics and protest, and mass media (Lindsay, “The Making of a Space of Exception: the War on Drugs, Agamben, and Ciudad

Juarez,” Cultural Geography, August 2011, http://lindsayparkerdotnet.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/the-making-of-a-space-of-exception.pdf)//bghs-BI

The “war on drugs” was introduced into the American lexicon by Richard Nixon in 1971 (Cockburn & St. Clair 1998) as a continuation of the prohibitionist drug laws originating from 1914’s Harrison Narcotics Tax Act. The “war on drugs” was simultaneously enforced with Nixon’s “war on crime” that both emphasized “radical turn[s] from welfarist criminal justice approaches emphasizing rehabilitation and redistribution, towards coercive penal governance” (Corva 2008:178). Whereas a welfarist order understood illicit behaviour as symptomatic of an unjust socio-economic society and tried to rehabilitate users, the penal state adopted strict rules that would place offenders in prison for even small amounts of possession (Beckett & Sassoon 2000). Currently this “zero tolerance” policy emphasizes prohibition, halting production, distribution, and the consumption of drugs at the cost of $15 billion annually to the federal government, with state and local governments spending another $25 billion in 2010 alone (Office of National Drug Control Policy 2010). Yet the response nationally and internationally from civilians, lawyers, medical professionals, academics, and police enforcement alike is that the “war on drugs” is an overwhelming failure that has not reduced drug use, drug trafficking, or violent crime, but that has rather resulted in the growth of a multi-billion annual black market that promotes violence and results in harmful repercussions to society (Baum 1996; Bertram 1996). A major source of this violence stems from rival drug cartels throughout Central and South America fighting for trade routes and access to portals along the US/Mexican border across which they can smuggle narcotics for US consumption. The passing of NAFTA in 1994 made trafficking easier and more efficient than ever before (Andreas 1995; Campbell 2009) resulting in the competition for domination of border towns and cities, such as Ciudad Juarez, positioned a mere two miles away from the American border. This strategic location is crucial because of the United States’ insatiable demand for narcotics, especially cocaine. It is estimated that 80-90% of Central and South American cocaine ends up in the United States making border cities and towns incredibly valuable and vulnerable spaces of violent competition (United Nations 2010). As Mexico and the United States keep battling drug cartels in what seems an impossible war to win, narcotics are illegally exported into the United States where demand is still high. The war on drugs and resulting turf war in Juarez are indicative of a re-configuration of geographies of sovereignty and exceptional space along and beyond the border. Sovereign power is a key theme to Agamben’s Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998). Translated from “Sacred Man, “homo sacer” refers to a bare life that is stripped of all citizens” rights that can be killed by anyone without punishment. Human life becomes politicized as it becomes dominated by the sovereign’s suspension of juridical order allowing for otherwise illegal crimes to become normalized because where there is no law, nothing can be illegal. This state of exception is a “point of indistinction between violence and law, the threshold on which violence passes over into law and law passes over into violence” (1998: 32). This threshold is at the core of what Agamben calls the paradox of sovereignty. If sovereign powers are able to declare spaces of exception or suspend the law, they are effectively placing themselves outside of the law. In his own work Agamben uses the example of Nazi concentration camps to exercise the tangibility and physicality of a space of exception, or where juridical order has been indefinitely suspended by sovereign actors. More recently, Agamben and others have identified Guantanamo Bay as such a space (Butler 2002; Gregory 2006). In these examples the sovereign powers, though acting within or outside of the law, were state actors. Agamben’s reading of sovereignty loosely follows Westphalian tenets including the principle of the sovereignty of states and fundamental right to self-determination, the principle of international law equality between states, and the principle of non-intervention of one state in the internal affairs of another state (Lyons & Mastanduno 1995). Traditional theorizations of sovereignty stemmed from Westphalia have increasingly come under scrutiny with some even posing the end of a traditional sovereignty in the political realm (Camilleri & Falk 1992; Hardt & Negri 2000; Ward 2003). These are important in considering how ideas of sovereignty have shifted through history and political landscapes including times of civil disobedience, terrorism, war, and globalization, which is especially intertwined (geo)politically and economically with the drug war. The drug war in Juarez is another example that is challenging traditional ideas of how sovereignty is practiced on the ground and how strict binaries of legal and illegal are being nullified and subverted as sovereign state actors are losing power to drug cartels.

#### The war metaphor remains dominant in official discourse surrounding drugs, collapsing the distinction between criminal and enemy – peace is impossible until the enemy is annihilated

Lajous, 12 – doctor of Law at Yale, professor and researcher at Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica, a Mexican center of research and higher education specialized in social sciences (Alejandro Madrazo, “Criminals and enemies? The Mexican drug trafficker in official discourse and in narcocorridos,” translated by Fernanda Alonso)//bghs-BI

III. The criminal and the enemy in the official discourse On December 4th, 2006, just three days after assuming the presidency of the Mexican government, Felipe Calderon announced the first deployment of federal forces, Army included, so as to perform police functions in a state: his native state, Michoacan. "Be assured that my government is working hard to win the war against crime" (Calderón, 2011q). With this, the President defined his crime fighting strategy as a war; he justified the move on the fact that the number of drug-related killings in the region during the previous year exceeded 500.10 A few weeks later, on January 22, 2007, at the XXI Session of the National Security Council, the President went further: "To win the war against crime it is essential that we work together beyond our differences [...] beyond any political party’s flag and any private interest." (Calderon, 2007n) He presented the war as a reason to demand national unity in a country deeply divided by party likes and dislikes, after a competed and questioned election. Infancy is destiny; the use of war metaphors marked the official narrative surrounding crime and security throughout the his administration. Since then, the government does not pursue common criminals in the fulfillment of police functions or law enforcement, but instead confronts them in a war, for which there will be no truce until the enemy is defeated. The war jargon in the war on drugs has dominated the narrative, the political imaginary and the current government policy. The war metaphor in the government’s discourse has obvious practical and strategic functions. On the one hand, "(...) it is applied to keep justifying the use of the Armed Forces..." (Miguel Lopez Norzagaray David 2010; 172), one of the building blocks of the security policy for the administration. On the other hand, it functions as a rhetorical framework to call for national unity. However, it also has consequences that go beyond those that it seemingly seeks. On the one hand, it builds up crime and on the other it blurs the boundaries between different categories within the law. The government does not prosecute people who commit different types of crimes –kidnapping, drug trafficking, and murder– but crime itself. In this sense, "(...) drug trafficking was framed within a larger enemy, an enemy that is even more sparse than the very same drug trafficking, one ranging from common crime to the organized social structure needed to commit a crime." (Norzagaray Lopez 2010; 229) This section looks to explore how, in the official discourse dominated by the war metaphor, the distinction between criminal and enemy collapses. By labeling delinquents as enemies, President Calderon is not only establishing an identity between the terms, but also establishing in the political imaginary, on which he reflects and builds his discourse, that the criminal fulfills the function of the enemy (and not only shares his label).11

#### Politicizing the criminal as the enemy subjects them not to law but unlimited sovereignty, enabling the state to justify sacrifice of the political community and making civil war inevitable

Lajous, 12 – doctor of Law at Yale, professor and researcher at Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica, a Mexican center of research and higher education specialized in social sciences (Alejandro Madrazo, “Criminals and enemies? The Mexican drug trafficker in official discourse and in narcocorridos,” translated by Fernanda Alonso)//bghs-BI

II. The criminal and the enemy in the political imaginary8 The temptation to label a criminal as an enemy and point him out as "public enemy number 1”, is enormous, especially when the threat he represents is perceived as overwhelming. But the distinction between a criminal and an enemy in the political imaginary is crucial: it reflects and supports the distinction between sovereignty and law, between political action –in its strictest sense— and legal action. Criminals and enemies may do the same violent acts, destroying property and persons. Nevertheless, the modern political imaginary carefully maintained the distinction as a matter of both formal law and informal representation. (Kahn, 2010; 1) In the modern political imaginary, the criminal and the enemy occupy different spaces: the criminal faces the law; the enemy faces sovereignty. Law is restricted, predetermined, it cannot overturn the rules that it is made up of; sovereignty is unlimited, unrestricted, subject only to its ability to affirm itself. The criminal is not the enemy; the enemy is not the criminal. The enemy can be killed but not punished. (…) On the other hand, the criminal can be punished but, in most of the West, he cannot be killed. (Kahn, 2010; 1)9 The distinction lies precisely on the difference between the criminal’s relationship to law and the enemy’s relationship to sovereignty. The criminal is a citizen, a part of the political community, and therefore enjoys the protection of the very laws which he infringes; the enemy is the opposite of a citizen, located outside the political community and posing a threat to it; consequently the enemy does not enjoy the protection of the law, nor is he under obligation to abide by it. Moreover, the enemy has the right to resist the violence of a political community to which he does not belong to; the criminal does not. Informally, warfare is imagined as a sort of duel: a reciprocal relationship of threat, of killing and being killed. (…) This is why every war is imagined as “self-defense” by both sides of the conflict. The confrontation with the criminal, on the other hand, is certainly not imagined as a duel. Criminals have no right of self-defense against the police. The force of law is asymmetrical. For this reason, we think of the violence of law – policing – as “depoliticized.” There is a corresponding depoliticalization of the violence of crime: it is not political threat, but personal pathology. Law enforcement aims to prevent the violence of the criminal from becoming a source of collective self-expression. Were it to become so, we would confront an enemy. (Kahn, 2010; 2) The law in a political community says nothing to its enemies, nor does it say anything about its enemies. The enemy does not operate in the restricted field of law, operating instead in the unrestricted space of sovereignty. Contrastingly, the criminal is determined by the law he infringes: Everything about the criminal is defined by law, from the elements of the crime, to the procedure of adjudication, to the character of punishment. His depoliticalization is accomplished through his complete juridification. The law, however, will not tell us who are our enemies. It will not define the conditions of victory or defeat. It will not tell us how seriously to take a threat or how devastating to make the response. The enemy, despite the efforts of international law, is not a juridical figure at all. (Kahn, 2010; 2) The enemy is located outside the political community and threatens it. Because of this, the enemy endows members of the community with an identity: they are ultimately identified in contrast to the person who is not a member of the political community: the enemy (who is in turn, identified in contrast to the first). The criminal does not fulfill that role in the political imaginary. His existence does not identify us, and he does not identify himself as opposed to the political community, but rather he participates in it. True, he participates from a marginal and stigmatized position, but he is part of the community that punishes him. Against the enemy, the state may legitimately require sacrifices from us –including our lives— so as to protect the continuity of the political community. Against the criminal, we require the State’s protection, not vice versa. We are presented then, with two very different categories, which must not be confused. The criminal is a member of the political community; the enemy is not. The criminal is subject to the law of the community and is simultaneously protected and bound by it; the enemy is not. The criminal should be punished; the enemy destroyed or subdued. The criminal is completely juridified (he is regulated and precisely constraint by the law) and, therefore, depoliticized; the enemy is necessarily a politicized subject (he defines the polis by opposing it) and cannot be understood through the law. But the distinction between criminal and enemy is not only important to them; the distinction is fundamental –foundational even– to the political community, i.e. to "us", all individuals belonging to it: At stake in the criminal/enemy distinction, I will argue, is the relationship of sovereignty to law. These are not just categories of theory, but the organizing principles of political and personal narrative. When we lose control of the categories, we can lose the sense of who we are. (Kahn, 2010; If we collapse the two categories, we lose our political identity. We no longer know who belongs to the "us" (the political community, which in principle, includes criminals) and who belongs to the "they" (the enemies). When the criminal becomes an enemy, the community’s action is no longer the application of law, but that of a civil war: Indeed, under some circumstances criminals do become enemies: the order of law becomes the disorder of civil war. (Kahn, 2010; 5) When the criminal is politicized, he is mistaken for the enemy; he becomes the enemy. He is no longer identified by the law (which signals him as an offender), but instead he is identified as that which opposes sovereignty, that is the political community; against which he is now "entitled" to confront. The community can no longer demand obedience from him. He goes from being in an asymmetrical relationship governed by the law to a symmetric relation (symbolically) analogous to a duel, in which the law disappears and all that remains is the contrast of two competing wills in the field of sovereignty. That is, in a space in which only a civil war can be deployed, no longer a normative system.

#### The biopolitical determination of the threshold beyond which life ceases to have juridical value creates the category of a “life devoid of value” which spills over to the biological body of every living being and nullifies value to death

Agamben, 98 – professor of philosophy at university of Verona (Giorgio, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, pg. 139-140)

It is not our intention here to take a position on the difficult ethical problem of euthanasia, which still today, in certain coun­tries, occupies a substantial position in medical debates and pro­vokes disagreement. Nor are we concerned with the radicaliry with which Binding declares himself in favor of the general admissibility of euthanasia. More interesting for our inquiry is the fact that the sovereignty of the living man over his own life has its immediate counterpart in the determination of a threshold beyond which life ceases to have any juridical value and can, therefore, be killed without the commission of a homicide. The new juridical category of “life devoid of value” (or “life unworthy of being lived”) corre­sponds exactly—even if in an apparently different direction—to the bare life of homo sacer and can easily be extended beyond the limits imagined by Binding. It is as if every valorization and every “politicization” of life (which, after all, is implicit in the sovereignty of the individual over his own existence) necessarily implies a new decision concerning the threshold beyond which life ceases to be politically relevant, becomes only “sacred life,” and can as such be eliminated without punishment. Every society sets this limit; every society—even the most modern—decides who its “sacred men” will be. It is even pos­sible that this limit, on which the politicization and the exceprio of natural life in the juridical order of the state depends, has done nothing but extend itself in the history of the West and has now— in the new biopolitical horizon of states with national sovereignty—moved inside every human life and every citizen. Bare life is no longer confined to a particular place or a definite category. It now dwells in the biological body of every living being.

#### When the legitimacy and existence of a population is in question, politics become murderous – the entirety of the world is reduced to bare life in an attempt to rid the public sphere of all risk. The only option becomes the extermination of all life

Duarte, 5 – professor of Philosophy at Universidade Federal do Paraná (André, “Biopolitics and the dissemination of violence: the Arendtian critique of the present,” April 2005, http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=andre\_duarte)//bghs-BI

These historic transformations have not only brought more violence to the core of the political but have also redefined its character by giving rise to biopolitical violence. As stated, what characterizes biopolitics is a dynamic of both protecting and abandoning life through its inclusion and exclusion from the political and economic community. In Arendtian terms, the biopolitical danger is best described as the risk of converting animal laborans into Agamben’s homo sacer, the human being who can be put to death by anyone and whose killing does not imply any crime whatsoever 13).  When politics is conceived of as biopolitics, as the task of increasing the life and happiness of the national *animal laborans*, the nation-state becomes ever more violent and murderous. If we link Arendt’s thesis from *The Human Condition* to those of The Origins of Totalitarianism, we can see the Nazi and Stalinist extermination camps as the most refined experiments in annihilating the “bare life” of *animal laborans* (although these are by no means the only instances in which the modern state has devoted itself to human slaughter). Arendt is not concerned only with the process of the extermination itself, but also the historical situation in which large-scale exterminations were made possible – above all, the emergence of ‘uprooted’ and ‘superfluous’ modern masses, what we might describe as *animal laborans* balanced on the knife-edge of ‘bare life.’ Compare her words in ‘Ideology and Terror’ (1953), which became the conclusion of later editions of The Origins of Totalitarianism: Isolation is that impasse into which men [humans] are driven when the political sphere of their lives… is destroyed… Isolated man who lost his place in the political realm of action is deserted by the world of things as well, if he is no longer recognized as homo faber but treated as an *animal laborans* whose necessary ‘metabolism with nature’ is of concern to no one. Isolation then become loneliness… Loneliness, the common ground for terror, the essence of totalitarian government, and for ideology or logicality, the preparation of its executioners and victims, is closely connected with uprootedness and superfluousness which have been the curse of modern masses since the beginning of the industrial revolution and have become acute with the rise of imperialism at the end of the last century and the break-down of political institutions and social traditions in our own time. To be uprooted means to have no place in the world, recognized and guaranteed by others; to be superfluous means not to belong to the world at all 14). The conversion of homo faber, the human being as creator of durable objects and institutions, into *animal laborans* and, later on, into homo sacer, can be traced in Arendt’s account of nineteenth century imperialism. As argued in the second volume of The Origins of Totalitarianism, European colonialism combined racism and bureaucracy to perpetrate the “most terrible massacres in recent history, the Boers’ extermination of Hottentot tribes, the wild murdering by Carl Peters in German Southeast Africa, the decimation of the peaceful Congo population – from 20 to 40 million reduced to 8 million people; and finally, perhaps worst of all, it resulted in the triumphant introduction of such means of pacification into ordinary, respectable foreign policies.” 15)  This simultaneous protection and destruction of life was also at the core of the two World Wars, as well as in many other more local conflicts, during which whole populations have become stateless or deprived of a public realm. In spite of all their political differences, the United States of Roosevelt, the Soviet Russia of Stalin, the Nazi Germany of Hitler and the Fascist Italy of Mussolini were all conceived of as states devoted to the needs of the national *animal laborans*. According to Agamben, since our contemporary politics recognizes no other value than life, Nazism and fascism, that is, regimes which have taken bare life as their supreme political criterion are bound to remain standing temptations 16).  Finally, it is obvious that this same logic of promoting and annihilating life persists both in post-industrial and in underdeveloped countries, inasmuch as economic growth depends on the increase of unemployment and on many forms of political exclusion. When politics is reduced to the tasks of administering, preserving and promoting the life and happiness of animal laborans it ceases to matter that those objectives require increasingly violent acts, both in national and international arenas. Therefore, we should not be surprised that the legality of state violence has become a secondary aspect in political discussions, since what really matters is to protect and stimulate the life of the national (or, as the case may be, Western) *animal laborans*. In order to maintain sacrosanct ideals of increased mass production and mass consumerism, developed countries ignore the finite character of natural reserves and refuse to sign International Protocols regarding natural resource conservation or pollution reduction, thereby jeopardising future humanity. They also launch preventive attacks and wars, disregard basic human rights, for instance in extra-legal detention camps such as Guantánamo,27)  and multiply refugee camps. Some countries have even imprisoned whole populations, physically isolating them from other communities, in a new form of social, political and economic apartheid. In short, states permit themselves to impose physical and structural violence against individuals and regimes (‘rogue states’ 18) ) that supposedly interfere with the security and growth of their national ‘life process.’ If, according to Arendt, the common world consists of an institutional in-between meant to outlast both human natality and mortality, in modern mass societies we find the progressive abolition of the institutional artifice that separates and protects our world from the forces of nature 19).  This explains the contemporary feeling of disorientation and unhappiness, likewise the political impossibility we find in combining stability and novelty 20).  In the context of a “waste economy, in which things must be almost as quickly devoured and discarded as they have appeared in the world, if the process itself is not to come to a sudden catastrophic end,” 21)  it is not only possible, but also necessary, that people themselves become raw material to be consumed, discarded, annihilated. In other words, when Arendt announces the “grave danger that eventually no object of the world will be safe from consumption and annihilation through consumption,” 22)  we should also remember that human annihilation, once elevated to the status of an ‘end-in-itself’ in totalitarian regimes, still continues to occur – albeit in different degrees and by different methods, in contemporary ‘holes of oblivion’ such as miserably poor Third World neighbourhoods 23)  and penitentiaries, underpaid and slave labour camps, in the name of protecting the vital interests of *animal laborans*. To talk about a process of human consumption is not to speak metaphorically but literally. Heidegger had realized this in his notes written during the late thirties, later published under the title of Overcoming Metaphysics. He claimed that the difference between war and peace had already been blurred in a society in which “metaphysical man [human], the animal rationale, gets fixed as the labouring animal,” so that “labour is now reaching the metaphysical rank of the unconditional objectification of everything present.” 24)  Heidegger argued that once the world becomes fully determined by the “circularity of consumption for the sake of consumption” it is at the brink of becoming an ‘unworld’ (Unwelt), since ‘man [human], who no longer conceals his character of being the most important raw material, is also drawn into the process. Man is “the most important raw material” because he remains the subject of all consumption.’ 25)  After the Second World War and the release of detailed information concerning the death factories Heidegger took his critique even further, acknowledging that to understand man as both subject and object of the consumption process would still not comprehend the process of deliberate mass extermination. He saw this, instead, in terms of the conversion of man into no more than an “item of the reserve fund for the fabrication of corpses” (Bestandestücke eines Bestandes der Fabrikation von Leichen). According to Heidegger, what happened in the extermination camps was that death became meaningless, and the existential importance of our anxiety in the face of death was lost; instead, people were robbed of the essential possibility of dying, so that they merely “passed away” in the process of being “inconspicuously liquidated” (unauffällig liquidiert). 26)  The human being as *animal laborans* (Arendt), as homo sacer (Agamben), as an ‘item of the reserve fund’ (Heidegger) – all describe the same process of dehumanisation whereby humankind is reduced to the bare fact of being alive, with no further qualifications. As argued by Agamben, when it becomes impossible to differentiate between biós and zóe, that is, when bare life is transformed into a qualified or specific ‘form of life,’ we face the emergence of a biopolitical epoch 27).  When states promote the animalisation of man by policies that aim at both protecting and destroying human life, we can interpret this in terms of the widespread presence of the homo sacer in our world: “If it is true that the figure proposed by our age is that of an unsacrificeable life that has nevertheless become capable of being killed to an unprecedented degree, then the bare life of homo sacer concerns us in a special way… If today there is no longer any one clear figure of the sacred man, it is perhaps because we are all virtually homines sacri.” 28) Investigating changes in the way power was conceived of and exercised at the turn of the nineteenth century, Foucault realized that when life turned out to be a constitutive political element, managed, calculated, and normalized by means of biopolitics, political strategies soon became murderous. Paradoxically, when the Sovereign’s prerogative ceased to be simply that of imposing violent death, and became a matter of promoting the growth of life, wars became more and more bloody, mass killing more frequent. Political conflicts now aimed at preserving and intensifying the life of the winners, so that enmity ceased to be political and came to be seen biologically: it is not enough to defeat the enemy; it must be exterminated as a danger to the health of the race, people or community. Thus Foucault on the formation of the modern biopolitical paradigm at the end of the nineteenth century:…death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reverse of the right of the social body to ensure, maintain or develop its life. Yet wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations. But this formidable power of death… now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life that endeavours to administer, optimise, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men [humans] to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars have caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. The atomic situation is now at the end of point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual’s continued existence. The principle underlying the tactics of battle – that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living – has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population. 29)  Arendt proposed no political utopias, but she remained convinced that our political dilemmas have no necessary outcome, that history has not and will not come to a tragic end. Neither a pessimist nor an optimist, she wanted only to understand the world in which she lived in and to stimulate our thinking and acting in the present. It is always possible that radically new political constellations will come into our world, and responsibility for them will always be ours. If we wish to remain faithful to the spirit of Arendt’s political thinking, then we must think and act politically without constraining our thinking and acting in terms of some pre-defined understanding of what politics ‘is’ or ‘should’ be. In other words, I believe that the political challenge of the present is to multiply the forms, possibilities and spaces in which we can act politically. These may be strategic actions destined to further the agendas of political parties concerned with social justice. They can also be discrete, subversive actions favoured by small groups at the margins of the bureaucratised party machines, promoting political interventions free of particular strategic intentions, since their goal is to invite radical politicisation of existence. Finally, there are also actions in which ethical openness towards otherness becomes political: small and rather inconspicuous actions of acknowledging and welcoming, of extending hospitality and solidarity towards others.

#### In the face of the hegemonic “war” discourse, an alternative has arisen in the public imaginary: the *narcocorrido*. Ambivalent but credible, epic but ordinary, it constitutes rebellion against a political system sustained on exceptionalism

Lajous, 12 – doctor of Law at Yale, professor and researcher at Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica, a Mexican center of research and higher education specialized in social sciences (Alejandro Madrazo, “Criminals and enemies? The Mexican drug trafficker in official discourse and in narcocorridos,” translated by Fernanda Alonso)//bghs-BI

IV. The criminal and the enemy in the saga of the narcocorrido There is popular tradition, deeply rooted in our country, that through various means such as literature, popular press, oral tradition and music, highlights and records the events of criminal’s lives, opposing the official discourse (see eg Speckman, 2002). One of the best-known means that materialize this tradition is the popular music genre known as the corrido, popular music relating noteworthy events and the daily life of communities. Specifically, the narcocorrido, presents itself as a contemporary successor or subgenre of the corrido. The narcocorrido is of interest here because it offers an alternative view to the official stance on drug trafficking in our country. Faced with a hegemonic official discourse on drug trafficking, popular culture, and on occasions the drug traffickers themselves,13 offer their vision of the phenomenon, through narcocorridos. Luis Astorga points out that some narcocorridos are spontaneous products of popular culture, while others are deliberately sponsored by drug traffickers themselves to build their own image. The two variants break the state monopoly ub geberatubg of the discourse referring to drug trafficking (Astorga, 1997). With the dawn of the narcocorridos, "the identity of the group was no longer subject to the will, imaginary and interest of those who had hitherto managed to impose their classifications, and turn them into official discourse" (Astorga, 1997, 2). Astorga argues that the stories told in the narcocorridos focus on presenting facts, rather than justifying them: "There is no justification for their activities, only an affirmation of situations where the primacy of the ethical codes and rules of the game at play are often disputed through gun shots" (Astorga, 1997, 10-1). The stories reflected in the narcocorridos are in fact ambivalent: torn between telling the facts and even criticizing them, or praising and vindicating the protagonists. For some, the narcocorridos tend more towards the second pole of this spectrum (Benavides et al., 2009, 152). Regardless of whether the stories told in the narcocorridos are understood as "documentation" of the popular interpretation of the facts or as a ladatio of the patrons of the musicians who compose them, the truth is that in recounting the events from the perspective of those living surrounded by drug trafficking and its profits, narcocorridos express cultural counter-values to the official discourse and culture. The narcocorrido is presented as the popular voice that contrasts with the discourse of political power; at least that is what it intends (Lara, 2003) (Wald, 2008). This is not to say that the narcocorrido (fully) articulates a political or ethical discourse, but rather it outlines one, providing an epic, but not enough to articulate an ethic14. It is the epic that is offered by the narcocorrido what perhaps allows us a glimpse into the roles of the criminal, authority, the law and the enemy in the popular imaginary of communities living near or in contact with drug-related business and its prohibition. Both the corrido and the narcocorrido deal with the heroic deeds of cultural heroes or individuals who are considered to be exceptional or considered to have done exceptional deeds, usually with great bravery and courage in the face of danger: soldiers and revolutionary leaders in the early twentieth century; drug traffickers and smugglers at the end of the same century. One of the main functions that wields the corrido and which made it so popular during the twentieth century, was the broadcasting of events that occurred during the period of the Mexican Revolution of 1910, which were very difficult to transmit from mass media such as newspapers ... for the majority of the population that was submerged in appalling illiteracy ... there was no point in disseminating the news in print ... the corrido (...) has definitely served as an important form in broadcasting, that brings us closer to life in the communities ... [In the corridos,] the Mexican masses have seen their desires, passions, frustrations and sympathies reflected. (Lara, 2003; 213) "The history of the narcocorrido goes all the way back to the corridos of border smugglers in the nineteenth century. In those years it was not marijuana, cocaine or heroin that was being smuggled, but fabrics, spices and clothing, among other goods. The flow of contraband also wasn’t like it is today, from south to north, but rather the opposite; goods were transported from the U.S. to Mexico." (Ramírez-Pimienta, 2011; 22) Alcohol prohibition, established in 1920 in the United States, led to the creation of a smuggling business from Canada and Mexico. For Mexican bootleggers, alcohol smuggling was a task that: "Was extremely dangerous and difficult, as the smugglers sometimes had to travel hundreds of miles trying to bring the cargo to its destination, whilst confusing the hated rinches, the Texas Rangers, who were in charge, along with federal agencies, of combating them. (...) It is in this context that the most important precursor of drug trafficking corridos is produced in the nineteen twenties and early thirties… the corridos about tequila smugglers. " (Ramírez-Pimienta, 2011, 35-36) From the origins of the smuggler’s corrido15, an important feature for understanding the relationships between traffickers and officials can be identified: "(...) we have found several notions that are still paradigmatic in the current narcocorrido. Namely, we found a strong collusion and transposition between drug dealer, police officer and politician. In other words, we have politicians and police who are traffickers or are protecting traffickers." (Ramírez-Pimienta, 2011; 68) Specifically, in its origins, the smuggler’s corrido identifies the foreign U.S. authority, or the national authority subdued to it, as threats to the protagonist: "(...) virtually no one in the corridística community would object to representing the American Rangers (be they soldiers, customs police or border patrol agents) in a negative fashion. The Anglo-Saxon with power over the Mexican community (or the Mexican under the services of Anglo- Saxon law) is a target accepted by this community, which perceives itself as victimized." (Ramírez-Pimienta, 2011; 35) In addition to identifying the U.S. authority as the threat to the smuggler (or the Mexican authority under the US authority), the smuggler’s corrido outlines another feature imputed to authority figures: their corruption and, consequently, their participation (usually subordinate) in crime. One of the most famous examples of this type of ballad is the 'Corrido de Mier', also known as 'The Mier customs' and 'The Ward' (...) [what is] narrated makes it clear from the first verses how incredible it is that they managed to mock the entire guard, i.e. all the employees of the customs office, opening the possibility that customs play the part of accomplices rather than smugglers’ incompetent enemies.16 With the narcocorrido, as a subgenre distinguished from the general corrido and as its closest ancestor, the corrido that specifically addresses contraband, grows the propensity to move from a mere chronicle of events or deeds to the elation of heroic deeds (not necessarily an epistle) of the protagonists of the events: This new type of corrido approves and praises those outside the law. It celebrates the heroism of those who are able to pass to the world of crime. In general, the narcocorridos are chronicles of adventure, betrayal, misfortune, love and other acts of individuals involved in the "business", another of the many synonyms of drug trafficking. Be it either through the common language or through key words and phrases, a partial, but credible vision of what drug trafficking is, is being embodied. Some corridos deal with the origins of the drug dealer, and others express the economic causes that push the ordinary Mexican to become a drug dealer. (Massard, 2005) The vision they provide is a criticism to the general context in which the adventure of the drug dealer comes to be, and therefore, it diverges from the official discourse. In speaking of criminals, of the poverty from which they escape, of the crimes and acts corruption, a vision is reflected which cannot but constitute itself as a critique of the world reflected in the official discourse. The narcocorrido reflects the economic crisis and the gradual decline of the system inherited from the Revolution. If it is true that the land reform returned the land to the peasants, today the small farmer has no way out and prefers to replace corn with marijuana, evidently increasing the value of land cultivated and the crop itself. Sociologists agree that narcocorridos represent a sample of the rebellion against a political system that not only fails to provides outputs, but has made corruption and impunity the pillars of its survival, since the tentacles of the drug trafficking have reached the echelons of power... (Massard, 2005) What do the narcocorridos say? What do they tell us about the place that drug traffickers, as criminals, play in the popular political imaginary? Do we see a politicization of the drug trafficker, which corresponds to his politicization in official discourse of the war on drugs?

#### Representations and exposition are the organizing principles behind the debate which we can challenge to alter power

Agamben, 2000 – professor of philosophy at the College International de Philosophie in Paris (Giorgio, Means Without End: Notes on Politics, p. 93-95)

Exposition is the location of politics. If there is no ani­mal politics, that is perhaps because animals are always already in the open and do not try to take possession of their own exposition; they simply live in it without car­ing about it. That is why they are not interested in mir­rors, in the image as image. Human beings, on the other hand, separate images from things and give them a name precisely because they want to recognize themselves, that is, they want to take possession of their own very ap­pearance. Human beings thus transform the open into a world, that is, into the battlefield of a political struggle without quarter. This struggle, whose object is truth, goes by the name of History. It is happening more and more often that in porno­graphic photographs the portrayed subjects, by a calcu­lated stratagem, look into the camera, thereby exhibiting the awareness of being exposed to the gaze. This unex­pected gesture violently belies the fiction that is implicit in the consumption of such images, according to which the one who looks surprises the actors while remaining unseen by them: the latter, rather, knowingly challenge the voyeur’s gaze and force him to look them in the eyes. In that precise moment, the insubstantial nature of the human face suddenly comes to light. The fact that the actors look into the camera means that they show that they are simulating; nevertheless, they paradoxically ap­pear more real precisely to the extent to which they ex­hibit this falsification. The same procedure is used to­day in advertising: the image appears more convincing if it shows openly its own artifice. In both cases, the one who looks is confronted with something that concerns unequivocally the essence of the face, the very structure of truth. We may call tragicomedy of appearance the fact that the face uncovers only and precisely inasmuch as it hides, and hides to the extent to which it uncovers. In this way, the appearance that ought to have manifested human be­ings becomes for them instead a resemblance that be­trays them and in which they can no longer recognize themselves. Precisely because the face is solely the loca­tion of truth, it is also and immediately the location of simulation and of an irreducible impropriety. This does not mean, however, that appearance dissimulares what it uncovers by making it look like what in reality it is not: rather, what human beings truly are is nothing other than this dissimulation and this disquietude within the appearance. Because human beings neither are nor have to be any essence, any nature, or any specific destiny, their condition is the most empty and the most insubstantial of all: it is the truth. What remains hidden from them is not something behind appearance, but rather appearing itself, that is, their being nothing other than a face. The task of politics is to return appearance itself to appearance, to cause appearance itself to appear. The face, truth, and exposition are today the objects of a global civil war, whose battlefield is social life in its en­tirety, whose storm troopers are the media, whose victims are all the peoples of the Earth. Politicians, the media establishment, and the advertising industry have under­stood the insubstantial character of the face and of the community it opens up, and thus they transform it into a miserable secret that they must make sure to control at all costs. State power today is no longer founded on the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence — a mo­nopoly that states share increasingly willingly with other nonsovereign organizations such as the United Nations and terrorist organizations; rather, it is founded above all on the control of appearance (of doxa). The fact that politics constitutes itself as an autonomous sphere goes hand in hand with the separation of the face in the world of spectacle — a world in which human communication is being separated from itself. Exposition thus transforms itself into a value that is accumulated in images and in the media, while a new class of bureaucrats jealously watches over its management.

#### **Our affirmation is a form of play that liberates debate from rigid rules and detaches humanity from the sacred**

Dragona, 8 – PhD Candidate in the Faculty of Communication and Mass Media at University Of Athens, Freelance media arts curator (Daphne, “WhoDaresToDe-sacraliseTodaySPlay,” Personal Cinema, Page Last Modified 24 April 2008, http://www.personalcinema.org/warport/index.php?n=Main.WhoDaresToDe-sacraliseTodaySPlay?)

Giorgio Agamben considers play a most important element in culture, explaining that it is the only one that can profane what is considered sacred. It can liberate humanity from the “sacred”, without negating it. It can profane the “sacred” without destroying the myth behind; it does not simply politicise. And if play is to cause changes and form our lives in better ways, this would be through its capacity to be an act of profanation by itself. But, unfortunately, this tendency according to Agamben is in decline and the need to regain it is a political necessity (Agamben 2006 : 127). What are the conditions of play today? Can it seriously play a role in our everyday lives? Who could re-attribute its capability to profane? Defining play There have been many definitions of play from different disciplines and orientations. Sutton – Smith in his book The Ambiguity of Play refers frequently to Mihail Spariosu who had called play “amphibolous” describing a basic disagreement between the Western philosophers over whether play is an orderly and rule- governed affair according to the common western society norms, or a chaotic, violent and indeterminate interaction of forces, according to some more modern approaches (Sutton Smith 1997/2001: 80). Roger Caillois had also seen two poles in play, but as a continuum where diversified forms could be set. On one extreme we find “paidia”, an “indivisible principle”, common to diversion, turbulence, free improvisation and carefree gaiety which is manifested by uncontrolled fantasy. At the other end, we find “ludus”, bound with “arbitrary, imperative and purposely tedious conventions”. The more the “frolic and impulsive exuberance” of paidia is “disciplined by an inversed tendency to its anarchic and capricious nature”, the more play approaches ludus (Caillois 1958/2001: 13). The Western European thought mostly followed the rationalistic common pattern and embraced the politicized, ruled form of play surpassing its anarchic and vivid features. This can be easily seen by the well known definitions of Huizinga and Caillois who, although they described play as free and unproductive activity, still insist on its dependency on the rules and its separation from everyday life. (Caillois 1958/2001: 43, Huizinga 1955: 13) Is it play or game? The old scholars, Huizinga and Caillois, did not especially differentiate the two terms. It seems that the rules that institutionalised play gave form to games. Play appears to be the idea, the notion, the anarchic and spontaneous basis, the activity based on fantasy, what Caillois called paidia, as Plato and Aristotle first put it. Accordingly, games seem to be the expressions and the forms of play that are governed by rules, demand discipline and form hierarchies, need a constraint space and time, reflecting more the ludus element. Generally, one could assume that play as a notion precedes games – it is their presupposition; it is the play ‘instinct’ that inspires the formation of forms. (Huizinga in Wark 2007: 181) In our times, with the explosion of the video game industry, the two words seem to have enclosed different features and ideas. Edward Castronova highlights the difference as follows: “Play is an intense, survival- relevant action that is not serious… Play is make believe… Play is an easy- to- copy behaviour that brings joy… Games are not the same thing as play. Games are designed goal environments with uncertain outcomes. They are social institutions. Games are a perfect environment for creating play, but also they appear under other circumstances. Elections… stock markets… wars are games.” (Castronova 2007: 100,101) In the digital era, games in the form of video games distant themselves more from play. Games compared to play can be described, can be analysed; they become a product, a commodity; they can be copied, copyrighted and become a subject of control. As Alexander R. Galloway notes, the video game is a cultural object bound by history and materiality, consisting of an electronic computational device and a game simulated in software (Galloway, 2006: 1) Risks of play Mckenzie Wark writes in his recent book Gamer Theory that games are no longer a past time, outside or alongside of life. They are now the very form of life, and death, and time, itself (Wark 2007: 06) To a certain degree, every civilization can be described and characterised by its games but what happens today is that life itself has taken the form of a game; of game and not play. While gaming platforms today are being used widely for different disciplines we might need to wonder: What are the risks play runs in this context? How could they be faced? The risk of contamination According to the classic thinkers of play, there was one main threat for play, its “contamination” by the ordinary life. Play could only be considered as a “stepping out of real life, into a temporary sphere with a disposition of its own” (Huizinga 1955: 8). The world of play and that of everyday life were considered as two different universes, antagonistic to each other (Caillois, 1958/2001: 44, 53). This austere distinction was what the situationists tried to break and to transcend. “Play, radically broken from a confined ludic time and space, must invade the whole of life”, they stated in 1958. The situationists with their notions of the psychogeographies, the derive, the situation and the détournement had proposed a fusion of play into the cities, a total swift where the player is in reality the “liver”. In our days, a different fusion of play occurred. Our everyday life is a fusion in itself of the virtual and the real. As Edward Castronova mentions “the real world can be a terribly empty place.” Synthetic worlds may offer experiences and opportunities that one might not have in their real life. Of course, “reality remains reality, strongly sensated but unfiltered, raw. It will always command attention, but it has long since abandoned the claim to all of our attention. We already live partly in media. Games are just the latest improvement.” (Castronova 2007: 30, 69) The risk of productivity Play is longer by definition an occasion of pure waste; waste of time, energy, ingenuity and skill. Play’s second major risk is the one formed by productivity, by players who belong to the generation of the prosumers, as they are producers and consumers at the same time. Play nowadays becomes part of the immaterial labour, within which as Lazzarato notes ‘leisure time’ and ‘working time’ are increasingly fused, making play – in our case- inseparable from work (Lazzarato 1997). This affective labor of play produces the informational and cultural content of the commodity that at the end is defined as game. Within this content stand today’s synthetic worlds where the players contribute voluntarily with their work and behaviour to the formation of the gaming worlds and the augmentation of the virtual economy. Communication is continually improved as the power of this form is found in the collective process, in the users/prosumers social relations. People of course might as well make profit for themselves. This kind of play can be to their advantage. But one can not overlook the fact that this era of ludocapitalism, as Dibbel frames it, is “a curious new post-industrial revolution, driven by play as the first one was driven by steam”. (Dibbell in Shaviro 2007) The risk of being the alibi The risk of play being exploited and being used as an alibi for economical or political profit is not a new one. The ambiguous –in ethic terms - economy of the casinos, the lotteries and the hippodromes or even the economy of the sports industry are such phenomena that have given birth to discussions, problems and even scandals for most of the countries of the Western world. However, the highest risk for play today is found in the exploitation of play being made by the military entertainment complex. War as a game is an old metaphor. Chess and Go and especially the 19th century Kriegsspiel which was used to aid Prussian officers, could be considered as predecessors of the games that would be used for military entertaining purposes later on (Halter 2002). But what the media and especially the video games changed was the possibilities given for nationalistic propaganda. Games like America’s Army, are at the same time a recruiting tool, an edugame, a test bed and tool and a propaganda game. Such games can influence attitudes and behaviours and win a communication battle that would otherwise be lost. Creating falsifying images of super-clean pure war, as seen on the screens, the games succeed in “using sweet power to win a war on ideas” (Neiborg 2007: 79) Summarizing the risks above, the impression given is that we have “nowhere to hide outside the gamespace” (Wark 2007: 183). But, are we trapped within a total game or is play itself trapped as well at the end? The sovereignity of the game over play today is a fact. Having been institutionalized, play has been accredited with the seriousness of an academic, social, political and economic value and has become an issue of controversial discussion accordingly. But in reality, again, it is mostly games we are talking about, not play. Contemporary play is purposely sacralised and distant, used as an excuse for games’ abuses. Being considered sacred, play’s case reminds us of religion. Religion does not unify all; on the contrary it keeps the roles distinct and separated. It keeps people apart from the divine (Agamben 2006: 124). So it happens with play, keeping the players apart from play itself. Could this separation be broken? And could play become an important contributory factor to our lives’ amelioration? Setting play free “It was in fact from art that play broke free” Raoul Vaneigem wrote in reference to Dada (Vaneigem 1967). To transcend rigid and crystallized forms, rules need to be broken. One can play by rules, or play with the rules. Freedom can be regained by those who can play with today’s forms of play, who can appropriate them, see through and reverse them, by those who can profane what is considered sacred. Following the famous predecessors of the dada, Surrealism, Fluxus and Situationism, artists today turn again towards play and use it as a means to challenge stereotypes, to offer new ways of reading and understanding, to break the constraints and offer new perspectives. Art merged with new media, activism, philosophy, politics and social sciences takes the role of the animator, the hacker, the player – “liver” today. Artists working on these fields through projects that do not necessarily need to be game – based, reveal play’ s multifaceted original character and propose means for its use, liberation and expansion within different sides of life. Play as play… Play can not be doubted and its fundamental role, original features and continuous presence is what some artists highlight. Axel Stockburger’s Tokyo Arcade Warriors – Shibuya and William Wegman’ s Dog Duet (Two Dogs and a ball) showcase how play absorbs one in the most serious and utter way. Documenting only the figures of players and not the action itself, one can still not deny or doubt play even if it is hidden. Other artists working on the field, show how playfulness is kept intact, while common playgrounds are being transformed into new ones based on technology. Such are the cases of Himalaya’ s Head by Devart where a snow war takes place between physical and virtual players or Jumping Rope by Orna Portugaly, Daphna Talithman and Sharon Younger, where participants are invited to jump a rope which is being turned by two virtual projected characters. Play back in action… Artists like the Ludic Society and Gordan Savicic follow a neo – situationist approach of play; they bring action back to the real dimension and spread it in the cities. In their projects they create ludic ambiances and city walks where the notions of the “dérivé”, the “détournement” and the “psychogeographies” are being appropriated to raise questions about today’s everyday life and potentialities for playfulness. Objects of Desire by the Ludic Society is a playful metaphor where objects take the place of subjects, with obsessions and desires that they follow to find their home. Gordan Savicic’ s Constraint City / the pain of everyday life is based on a corset with high torque servo motors and a WIFI-enabled game-console, that when worn, can write and read the city codes while also being a fetish object causing pain according to the strength of signal it gets. Following a different direction, David Valentine and MediaShed, also re-invite play back to the ordinary life, as seen on their video The duellists that documents a CCTV parkour performance. Two free-runners run an acrobatic competition in a shopping mall of Manchester Arndale. The fluid, uninterrupted movement of them acting as players re - energizes the environment in the most vivid and spontaneous way. Play caught in between… Other artists look into limits between the virtual and the real in today’ s play. The work of Silver and True named Sell your Rolex comments on the virtual dimension lived by millions of people today. Taking the roles of the user and its avatar, players note that behaviours of the virtual world are odd, funny and embarrassing when brought back to real life. How accurate is simulation after all in realistic terms? The MIT Lab with Stiff People’ s League mingles the two dimensions through a mixed reality game of soccer, happening simultaneously in the real space and in the world of Second Life. The common relationship between physical and virtual world is inverted as physical players need to rely on the virtual ones to play the game. Play reclaimed… Different questions are being raised by artists regarding play’s exploitation for purposes of political, nationalistic and ideological propaganda. Is morality a question? Are people conscious enough about what they are playing? John Klima in his project The Great Game.Epilogue brings reality into a game context as he incorporates in a child’s arcade ride true information from the conflict in Afghanistan, which has been collected by the Department of Defense of the US. John Paul Bichard with the Art of War addresses the issue of the representation of violence and its ways of interpretation through the contemporary media. Through two video works with footages from the army, one cannot tell what is real and what is imaginary anymore. In a similar direction, Vladan Joler has created the Schengen Information System, Version 1.0.3, a game where the player takes on the role of the activist who should intrude the building of the Schengen Information System and destroy the archives. Making use of publicly accessible technology and information, the artist has managed to make a realistic reconstruction and reverse the common use of games for military training purposes. Derivart wishing to tackle a socio-economical issue -that of real estate in Spain - use play to situate a problem and raise people’s awareness. The Burbujometro, showing the prices of apartments in different Spanish cities in the form of bubbles, that the user can shoot, criticizes the building boom of the 2000s. Play 2.0… The Folded-in project, created by Personal Cinema and the Erasers is a different critique on today’s play. The project examines the notion of borders in the era of the web 2.0 social networks. In the form of an online game application which reverses and criticizes the platform of YouTube, the projects seeks to find if players in the digital spaces could be liberated from their common prejudices and beliefs and to what extent they are supporters of immaterial labour, being the ideal prosumers. Taking this problem more to its extremes, one meets the phenomenon of the gold farming. Ge Jin with his documentary The Gold Farmers examines how the growth of virtual economy has given birth to the phenomenon of the gaming sweatshops and aims to answer how it leads play to become real work and what facts are hidden behind it. Play re-discussed… But how far can games and their creators go when observing, reproducing and criticizing today’s real world? Danny Ledonne, a young artist from Colorado, polarised the audience when he made a videogame of the Columbine assassination in the 90’s. Wishing to express this controversy, he made a documentary about the game investigating the issues of games, violence, and ethics. A lot of answers regarding the strategies followed by artists today and the phenomenon of the play culture, are also given in the 8 bit documentary by Marcin Ramocki & Justin Strawhand where they examine the overall influence play has in our everyday culture. CONCLUSION Play in our times presents a paradox. Despite its wide use and continuous presence in different forms of cultures, it is distant and trapped in its own formations, the games. Games are being accused; play is being sacrilised and is placed on a pedestal. Running certain risks, within this structure, play’s influential role on our culture is questioned. If, following Giorgio Agamben, play’s significance lies on the fact that it can detach humanity from the “sacred”, play would need to liberate itself first from the constraints of the sacred. To achieve this, one should not deny play; because this would lead to its cancellation. What one should do is to profane, to neglect, to surpass the constraints and break the rules. And this again can happen only through play itself, through its anarchic and vivid features that are today being wept out. This is how the actions taken by the artists can be described: as actions of profanity where they appropriate the myth and reverse the ceremony of the sacred. This violation is also an act of play itself that is then set free from all constraints. But there is one last point to remember: According to Agamben, profanation gains its complete meaning only when what has been profaned, is then rendered back to the people, at their disposal to start all over again. So this act is not an act of cancellation or politicisation; it is an act about raising awareness and about re-assigning to play its capacity to become a passage for true life, as Vaneigem would describe it. Can art fulfill this? Let’s hope so and wait and see…

#### Truth and predictability are nihilistic illusions built upon a myth of sameness and unity grounded in a fear of the flux and movement which lie at the heart of life – embrace the ecstasy of risk and the glory of active interpretation which uses force to wrest meaning from the abyss of nihilism.

**Lotringer, 1** – Professor of Foreign Philosophy at the European Graduate School in Saas-Fee, Switzerland, Professor Emeritus of Comparative Literature at Columbia University, (Sylvere, “The Dance of Signs” in Hatred of Capitalism: A Semiotext(e) Reader ed. Kraus&Lotringer, Los Angeles:Semiotext(e), pg 174-176)

Freud is not blind to this: "The producer which the author makes his Zoe adopt for curing her childhood friend's delusion shows a far reaching similarity - no, a complete agreement in its essence - with the analytical method which consists, as applied to patients suffering from disorders analogous to Hanold's delusion, in bringing to their consciousness, to some extent forcibly, the unconscious whose repression led to their falling ill" (Standard Edition, IX, 88). Such is the powerful thrust of similitude. Freud has no more qualms to reduce "poetic creations" to real persons or the "Pompeian fancy" to a simple "psychiatric study." Beneath the trappings of truth, on the razor's edge of demonstration, forces are confronting each other in order to turn the process - the text -into a product. If Gradiva adheres so perfectly to the analytical mold, the analysis of the novel must serve as an absolute proof, in Freud's words, of the theory of the unconscious. Absolute proof - or absolute counter-proof... Even thought "absolute" is clearly too strong a word for such a circum-scribed operation, to counter Freud's interpretation and thus unsettle he theory of the unconscious is indeed the substance of the present attempt. Not to replace Freud's elaborate construct with another, more powerful, mode of evaluation would certainly prove the wisdom in the face of the illusion of truth. Although "nihilistic" at heart, such a perspective is not bound to be simply negative. It can attest to a growing force. I realize that I can overcome the temptation of total interpretations, whose values are universal (they are actually symptoms of fear and apathy). To destroy the belief in the law, to dissipate the fiction of predictability, to reject the sage recurrence of the "same," this is not just a "critical" stand. It is an act of force. But destruction must not open onto an absence of values, worthless or meaninglessness. It must lead to a new evaluation. Nietzsche sees in the wisdom of the East a principle of decadence, a weakening of the power of appropriation. Force of intention matters more than will to truth. To reject truth without intensifying the force of invention still participates in the ascetic ideal, thus in ressentiment. "To read off a text without interposing an interpretation" therefore is "hardly possible" (The Will to Power, 479). I must use my creative forces to create values without falling into the inertia of truth or an anemia of will. I must render the text, and the world, to their "disturbing and enigmatic character"; will them incomprehensible, elusive, "in flux," only indebted to perspective valuations: "The greater the impulse toward unity, the more firmly may one conclude that weakness is present; the greater the impulse toward variety, differentiation, inner decay, the more force is present" (WP, 655). Inner decay: to dance away over oneself. Motion, not emotions. Freud's interpretation resists the false neutrality of science. It only shows a sign of decline when it aims for the truth, when it succumbs to the temptation of unity, the sick security of monism, the illusion of a reconciliation. A reactive interpretation, it assumes powerful, but fabricated, weapons: the difference between objects and subjects, cause and effect, means and ends, etc. That Gradiva presents a certain order of succession in no way proves that individual moments are related to one another as cause and effect, that they obey a "law" and a calculus but rather that different factions abruptly confront each other in their attempt to draw their ultimate consequence at every moment. "As long as there is a structure, as long as there is a method, or better yet as long as structure and method exist through the mental, through intelligence, time is trapped - or else we imagine we have trapped it" (John Cage, Pour les Oiseaux. Belfond, 1976, 34). Structural analysis properly discerned that a narrative establishes | a confusion between time (succession) and logic (cause and effect). However, instead of "delogifying" time, it forced narrative time to sub-mit to narrative logic. Far from being dispelled, the confusion became the very springboard of analysis! It is high time to take advantage of this latency of the narrative, of the divorce between consequence and construction, in order to "rechronocize" succession. I will, here and now, stop wanting the story to go somewhere. I will forget what I know feebly, in advance, in order to gather the whole complexity of forces at play in a text. I will learn to resist the melody of casual relations and the torpor of narrative accumulations in order to reinvent the intensity of risks, ceaselessly menacing and forever being reborn.

## 2AC

### AT: War on Drugs Good

#### State-based policies to combat drugs structurally fail

Freeman and Luis Sierra, 5 (\*Laurie, Director for Yemen at the National Security Council, former State Department Official, fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America, writer for the Washington Post Mexico Bureau, M.A. in International Politics from Princeton University, degree from Duke in Latin American Studies, \*\*Jorge, Knight International Journalism Fellow, degree in International Journalism from the University of Southern California, defense policy and economics fellow at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University, “Mexico: The Militarization Traip”, 2005, part of “Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The impact of U.S. Policy”, Rienner, Google Books)

U.S. drug control policy toward the Caribbean has failed to achieve even minimal objectives. Not only is the drug trade as deeply rooted as ever in the area; related violence and illicit drug consumption are on the rise. Changing U.S. priorities could, however, provide an opportunity for new policy approaches across the region. As the United States turns its attention elsewhere, the Caribbean and other countries may be given the flexibility they need to develop integrated alternative policies that take into account the complex socioeconomic challenges they face. It is vital that the spectrum of public debate be broadened, that is, democratized. Government resources should not be used to delegitimize alternative to critical positions, as has been the practice of the U.S. drug control bureaucracy.

#### Hasn’t curtailed illegal drug trade

Boesler, 12 (Matthew, reporter for Business Insider's markets desk, and Ashley Lutz, writer for Business Insider's retail section, “32 Reasons Why We Need To End The War On Drugs,” Business Insider, 7/12/12, http://www.businessinsider.com/32-reasons-why-we-need-to-end-the-war-on-drugs-2012-7?op=1)

The 'war on drugs' is insanely expensive In the past 40 years, The US has spent more than $1 trillion enforcing drug laws. Annually, the US spends at least $15 billion a year on drug law enforcement. Globally, over $100 billion is spent fighting the war on drugs every single year. **All that money is** in practice **a complete and total waste** United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Since the global war on drugs began, drug use has expanded steadily, the exact opposite outcome the war is meant to effect. There have been nearly no official cost benefit analyses of the war on drugs, leaving the door wide open for all kinds of unexpected harm caused and little accountability.

#### Their epistemology is flawed – the benefits of War on Drugs constitute a hyperbolic ruse perpetuated by the government – drug trade is only violent because it’s a reaction to the war on drugs

Fukumi, 8 (Sayaka, PhD student in International Relations at the University of Nottingham, *Cocaine Trafficking in Latin America*, Ashgate Publishing Company, pg. 90-94)

Crime and Violence related to Cocaine The use of violence by traffickers and dealers is a common feature in the cocaine trade. However, some argue that violence in cocaine trafficking is not as high as it is reported by the media. Brownstein maintains that cocaine-related violence is a social construction of politicians, policy-makers and law enforcers through the media in order to promote a drug scare and to encourage public support for the expansion of law enforcement and the contraction of civil liberties.87 Also, Zimring and Hawkins maintain that the cocaine trade may play a substantial role in predatory crime in the United States, yet there is not enough evidence to prove causality.88 Violence seems to play a significant role in the cocaine trade, although some facts reported by the government could have been exaggerated. MacCoun and Reuter identify the potential causes of violence at drug scenes, particularly crack and cocaine, as: the youthfulness of participants; the value of the drugs themselves; the intensity of law enforcement; and the indirect consequence of drug use.89 For the dealers and traffi ckers, violence is a necessary means to protect their business because of its illegal nature.90 In respect to the use of violence in the cocaine trade, according to Goldstein et al, between 1984 and 1988 drug and alcohol-related homicides increased by 11%.91 Among the homicide cases, systemic homicides tripled in 1988 in comparison to 1984, and 88% were related to either cocaine or crack dealings.92 The increase of systemic homicides related to the cocaine trade could result from the expansion of the cocaine market as well as the Colombian distribution networks. At the higher levels of the cocaine distribution system, the cell managers of the Colombian cartels apply violence as punishment and as warnings. Fuentes believes that: ‘A respected manager with the effective use of violence tends to have less betrayal by both customers and workers.’93 For the cell managers, violence is a tool to keep order and enforce the rules to operate their transaction successfully. The individual dealers at the lower levels of the cocaine distribution system use violence in the same manner to ensure payment from customers and to protect their own turf. At the street level dealings of cocaine, dealers purchase the drug on either a ‘cash’ or ‘consignment’ basis through their own networks.94 Making deals in this manner often is a cause of violent disputes over the payment because the customers fail to return with the rest of the payment by the agreed date. This kind of operation through loose individual connections with weak hierarchical structures is known as the ‘freelance model’.95 Curtis and Wendel describe the characteristics of cocaine dealing in this manner as: Freelancing tends to be the most visible, disruptive, and violent form of market organization. Socially bonded organizations are based on social ties, such as kinship, ethnicity, and neighborhood. They are held together by personal relationships, are often discreet about their sales practices (for example, they tend not to advertise drugs openly in the street), and are often less violent and disruptive to their communities than are other types of drug-dealing organizations.96 The lack of ties between individual dealers and the community to which they belong made them indifferent to others, and apply violence frequently. Therefore, Goldstein concludes that homicides in the drug scene are more likely to be a result of ‘illicit drug market disputes rather than psychopharmacological effects of crack’.97 Turning to the relationship between law enforcers and some local communities, there are conflicts between them, particularly within inner-cities. This is because the local people have felt abused by the law enforcers. It relates to the anti-loitering laws that give the law enforcement agents the right to arrest suspected drugrelated offenders based solely on profiles. Impressions from the profi les can be largely infl uenced by personal beliefs and values. As Glasser and Siegel point out, this operation contains the danger of twisting the facts with prejudice residing in officials.98 It creates the risks of cocaine related arrests being the result of prejudice in the law enforcement agents.99 For example, since there is a perception that the cocaine trade is largely controlled by the Hispanic and black population, there is prejudice against these minority groups. The prejudice has shaped particular trends that do not fi t the profi le of American cocaine use. The controversy in the trends is that the majority of cocaine users are white middle-class suburbanites and the majority of cocaine arrests are unemployed black males.100 Due to such prejudice in the law enforcers, in some inner cities, such as Baltimore, more than 50% of the black male population between the ages of 18 and 35 were imprisoned.101 Furthermore, in 1989, black and Hispanics constitute 92% of all those arrested as drug offenders, although government statistics show that blacks constitute only 15–20% of US drug users.102 Arrest without warrant based on police suspicion of cocaine dealing may be effective to capture people, but at the same time, it can increase distrust of law enforcement enforcers. Such sentiment can increase hostility toward law enforcers. McCoun and Reuter argue that the dispute between the communities and law enforcers is evident because the ways in which some police officers treat cocaine offenders were so inhumane that conflict between inner-city citizens and the police emerged.103 It is likely that the cocaine scene is associated with violence by the traffi ckers to protect their deals, although the frequency and level of violence could vary. McKenan reports that hostility and violence against the police is so fierce that no police officers can enter some areas.104 Following the absence of offi cial law enforcement mechanisms, the areas tend to be ruled by the drug traffi ckers. Under such circumstances, there are possibilities that bystanders will be the victims of shootings between cocaine traffickers.105 Although there are cases of violence in some areas, it usually targets particular people, such as traitors to the traffi cking organisations, and politicians and law enforcers acting against traffi ckers’ interests. The possibility of cocaine users getting involved in violent crime, such as homicide, is low, but usually they are more likely to be involved in property crime and theft in order to obtain fi nancial resources to use drugs.106 The neighbourhood of the areas with large numbers of cocaine users suffer from higher rates of petty crime, such as burglary and theft. The police are reluctant to answer non-drug related cases when they are called. As a consequence, statistics released by the Los Angeles Times state that ‘only about 47% of all slayings from 1990 and 1994 were even prosecuted in Los Angeles County, compared with about 80% in the late 1960s.’107 This approach appears to be over emphasising the drug related cases and neglecting other criminal cases. In addition to the insecurity arising from the increase of violence associated with cocaine traffi cking, the government has been seriously concerned about the harm to health posed by the use of cocaine. The number of cocaine users peaked in the 1990s, and then started to decline.108 Following the trend of decline, according to reports from the DEA and ONDCP, the statistics indicate that cocaine users (including both heavy and casual) remain about 2.4% of the total population.109 The health problems related to the cocaine trade are more likely to be caused by the related activities of the cocaine addicts, such as prostitution. Therefore, the high HIV positive rates among US cocaine users have been regarded as a consequence of needle sharing since other developed countries in which the government offers harm reduction programmes110 register lower rates.111Some cocaine addicts tend to engage in prostitution to support their habit.112 Through these, the cocaine addicts may spread infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS and other sexual diseases to the community. For example, Colorado Springs, which is known for high infection rates of HIV in the community, has a large number of prostitutes and injecting drug users.113 According to the research by Neaiguset al., the sample of injecting drug users contained 40% HIV seropositive, a disease that is transmitted by syringe sharing and sexual behaviours.114 These studies indicate that the existence of a large community (network) can trigger the rapid spread of HIV. There are also dangers to health associated with cocaine use. However, the harm of actual cocaine use (such as instant addiction and death), according to Baum, has been exaggerated by the government.115 There are certainly health problems caused by the frequent use of cocaine. Those consuming cocaine excessively over long periods of time may experience paranoia, hallucinations and physical damages, and also tend to become aggressive.116 Cocaine is not a physically addictive substance like opium, and normally death is caused by an overdose. The media has sensationalised information related to cocaine and crack by showing ‘crack babies’ being ‘addicted’ to cocaine in their mother’s womb.117 In reality, the infl uence of cocaine on unborn babies has yet to be proved.

### AT: Failed States

#### The affirmative’s discourse of “failed states” legitimizes an interventionist epistemology that effaces difference, makes north-south inequality inevitable, and is self-fulfilling

Eisenträger 12 (Stian Eisenträger, MA student in IR, board member at International Reporter, a Norwegian NGO, 3-27-12, “Failed State or Failed Label?: The Concealing Concept and the Case of Somalia,” <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/03/27/failed-state-or-failed-label-the-concealing-concept-and-the-case-of-somalia/>) gz

The end of the Cold War shaped a new international political context where the issues of democracy and human rights were brought out from the internal to the external scene. The weakened role of the Soviet Union gave the United States the possibility to increase its global influence. In this context *the absence of effective government* emerged on the world political agenda together with the concept of the “failed state” (Akpinarli 2009). Boutros Boutros-Gali and Kofi Annan, the former Secretaries-General of the UN, used the “failed state” term as early as in 1990, although the General Assembly or the Security Council never used it. Somalia, which was a typical case of the absence of effective government, was described by the UN without the use of the term “failed state”. The concept was then applied for the first time in the article “Saving Failed States” published in the winter edition of Foreign Policy Magazine in 1992-1993 (Helman & Ratner). This article, which was written in the post-Cold War context with its high aspirations for democracy, human rights, the more active role of the United Nations in safeguarding collective security and the emergence of the United States’ as the leading agenda-setting actor, established the basic concept and the paradigm. Although some have tried to incorporate “failed states” in international law, the term is highly debated because of the neo-colonial notion attached to it (Akpinarli 2009, 87-89). According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, the word “fail” can have a range of different meanings: “to lose strength”, “to fade or die away”, “to stop functioning normally”, “to fall short”, “to be or become absent or inadequate”, “to be unsuccessful” and “to become bankrupt or insolvent” (Merriam-Webster 2011). Thus, I would argue that the word is too imprecise to be meaningful in our attempt to broaden our understanding of the world. In addition, the word is heavily value-laden and has loads of negative connotations attached to it, and therefore I find it unsuitable to use in science. That journalists and politicians still use the term, which is both catchy and tabloid, is understandable when we take into consideration the rather brutal limitations of time and space these two occupational groups have in their struggle to reach their audiences. Nevertheless, numbers of scholars have used and still use the failed state label, many even without engaging critically with the term (Bates 2008; Ghani & Lockhart 2008; Holzgrefe & Keohane 2003, just to mention a few). The urge to “fix”: Securitization and intervention The failed state paradigm implies that there is something that needs to be “fixed” or “saved” – of course by “good” liberal democratic external forces. “Preventing states from failing, and rescuing those that do fail, are (…) strategic and moral imperatives”, Robert I. Rotberg (2002) proclaims in an article with the dramatic title “Failed States in a World of Terror” (the argument is elaborated in his book, bearing the same title). One can feel the notion of “the white mans burden”. One of the most neoliberal contributions in the failed states debate is probably that of Ashraf Ghani & Clare Lockhart (2008, 124) who in their book “Fixing failed states” boldly declare that “today states must fulfil their citizens’ aspirations for inclusion and development and also carry out a constellation of interrelated functions”. They conclude that states “in the world today” should perform ten key functions, which are: 1) Rule of law; 2) A monopoly of the legitimate means of violence; 3) Administrative control; 4) Sound management of public finances; 5) Investments in human capital; 6) Creation of citizenship rights through social policy; 7) Provision of infrastructure services; 8) Formation of a market; 9) Management of public assets; 10) Effective public borrowing. So now when we have the list, can we just go out in the world and start “fixing”? Fixing “failed states” is a dangerous exercise: For many policymakers the failed state label contributes to open up for and make a good excuse for military and other interventions. Petra Minnerop shows how the US throughout the second half of the 20th century developed several terms, for example “rogue states”, for “states to which it ascribed a high threat potential as regards the United States and international security” (2003). In the years to follow after the 1992 article in Foreign Policy Magazine the international community, with the US in the leading role, carried out military interventions in Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq on the basis that the chaotic situation in these states poses a threat to the US and international security in general. The terms “failed state”, “rogue state” and “war on terror” have all been given prominent roles in the public debate. As Akpinarli also remarks, these concepts have been invented by the North to “solve” problems in the South, as well as to advocate for and justify military interventions to protect international peace and security (Akpinarli 2009). I would argue that the concept rather causes more trouble than it solves – not only in terms of military intervention, but also by keeping “failed” states in the margins of international relations. It would not be an exaggeration to claim that the labelling of “failed states” is a prime example of what the Copenhagen School of Security has dubbed *securitization*. The founding fathers of this concept point out that “a discourse that takes form of presenting something to an existential threat to the referent object does not by itself create securitization – this is a *securitizing move*, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such.” (Buzan et al. 1998, 25). The audience – in this instance, ordinary citizens in the North – has to a large extent accepted the “failed state” paradigm, especially with reference to Somalia. Both the media and the large organizations working with/in/for the “failed state” are acting as agents for the securitizing actors – that is the governments in the North, especially the United States’ government. Somalia has been among the top five on the list since the first Failed States Index was published in 2005, and since 2008 Somalia has had the dubious honour of being the world’s “most failed state”. Whether it is possible to measure a state’s “failure” is a question that probably requires a book to be answered. Since 2005 the magazine and Fund for Peace have ranked the world’s countries after measuring the following variables: Demographic pressures, refugees/IDPs, group grievance, human flight, uneven development, economic decline, delegitimization of the state, public services, human rights, security apparatus, factionalized elites and external intervention (Fund for Peace 2011). No doubt that all these measurements may give a good indicator of how the situation is in a number of countries. However, my point and critique is that the index fails in grasping the vast empirical variations within the research object itself in the case of Somalia. Using the juridical state of Somalia as the object of analysis without looking under the surface becomes a serious hindrance of capturing the full picture. Somalia’s image problem As Michael C. Williams (2003, 527) excellently points out, “Security policies today are constructed not only with the question of their linguistic legitimation in mind; they now are increasingly decided upon in relation to acceptable image-rhetorics”. In this context we can identify the visualization of the verbal rhetoric of the failed state paradigm. The presentation of ”failed states” is often accompanied with depictions of a war-torn hell-hole, and the Foreign Policy Magazine takes the lead by presenting the Failed States Index together with a collection of photos appearing under the splash heading: “Postcards from Hell” (Foreign Policy Magazine 2011). When the Failed States Index is referred to by other news outlets, this kind of presentation is reproduced (for a recent example, see: BBC 2011a). I have yet to see an example of any media organization to examine the Index more closely. Only telling one side of the story is a serious problem. We can compare the use of the “failed state” label with how Somalia is depicted in the daily media coverage. How many times can you remember to have seen the pictures from Somalia, the disaster zone, with starving children, heavily armed Islamist fighters and dead people being dragged through the streets by a cheering mob? Quite a few times, I suppose. On the other hand, how many times have you seen pictures from Somalia showing farmers working in their fields, smiling and playful children, or the beach in Mogadishu crowded with both men, women and children? Probably not at all. Of course, the pictures of the disaster zone of Somalia are real and by every journalistic standard it is right to publish such pictures. The practice becomes a problem when these are the only pictures that are being shown, when the stories about starving children and dangerous terrorists are the only stories that are being told about Somalia outside Somalia. This misrepresentation in the media can for a large part be attributed to the “failed state” label that is burn-marked on the country, and which pay so little attention to the variations within the geographical area that makes up the state of Somalia. When a statement is repeated enough times, it becomes a “truth”. Politicians and scholars, as well as the media itself are responsible for this brand marking, and the process is self-reinforcing. The situation has reached the point where members of the Somali diaspora community in Norway has established an organization with one of its main goals to adjust the picture that has been made of Somalia and the Somali people (Iftiin – somalisk-norsk kunnskapssenter 2011). Somalia has a serious image-problem – literally. Not only does this put the country in risk of external intervention, it also contributes to keep Somalia and much of its population in the margins of international relations. There is a lack of representation of the people inhabiting the territory of the Somali Republic, both because the TFG lacks authority, but also because of the non-recognition of the de facto states of Somaliland and Puntland. Here we have to functional geopolitical entities that are not represented in the UN nor in other global or regional institutions. Furthermore foreign investors and tourists stay away because of the perception and understanding of the whole of Somalia being a ”failed state”. Africaand the Knowledge of Non-Being In his classic work Orientalism, Edward Said (2003 [1978]) scrutinize the history and nature of Western attitudes towards the East. He argues that orientalism is a powerful European ideological creation and a way for dealing with the “otherness” of Eastern culture, customs and beliefs. Achille Mbembe applies much of the same argumentation in his critique of Africanism. He says that historically, the West has constructed its own civilization, enlightenment and progress through the “others”, thus non-Western cultures, and especially Africa. Mbembe argues that: “Africa as an idea, a concept, has historically served, and still continues to serve, as a polemical argument for the West’s desperate desire to assert its difference from the rest of the world” (Mbembe 2001, 2). One of the challenges in grasping how things work outside the Western world is that many, if not even all, of the concepts we use when describing the universe of International Relations is based in Western history and thinking. Max Weber’s famous definition of the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory (Weber et al. 1991, 78). In Western thinking, Weber’s definition represents the *idea* of an “ideal state”, and it seems like many have the perception that Western states fit into this idea or norm. When analyzing states in Africa, this is revealed when African states are compared with the *idea* of an “ideal state”, which is believed to be a prototype of a Western state – leading to the focus on African states’ absences, lacks and incompleteness, as weak or failed. In this way Mbembe’s analysis is straight to the point when he states that “while we feel we know nearly everything that African states, societies, and economies *are not*, we still know absolutely nothing about *what they actually are*”. Our knowledge of Africa is to a large degree based on the knowledge of non-being (Mbembe 2001, 9). But claiming that the “Western state” resembles the Weberian state, or even that the “Western state” is the norm, is highly problematic. First of all, every state has its own specific features, and the higher the degree of generalization, the more problematic it is. Secondly, Weber’s state is an idea of a state that has never existed in practice – even not in Europe or North America – for example when we take into account the important fact that private violence and private security has existed through modern history, and even today. Abrahamsen & Williams (2010), Colás & Mabee (2010) and Thomson (1994) are among several scholars who have demonstrated how private violence and private security takes form in e.g. private companies, criminal organizations and vigilante groups. If the states in Europe and North America are to be judged by the same standards as the states in Africa, many of these could get the “failed” label as well. Noam Chomsky, for example, has turned the tables in his book “Failed States”, where he shows that the US shares features with other “failed states” (2007). But does the “failed state” label provide us with more and better insight into how different states work; does it enlighten us in any way? Definitely not. The label conceals more than it enlightens. Abrahamsen & Williams (2010) argues that we must look beyond the state when analysing security issues in Africa. I would argue that we must look both beyond and within the state also when we want to analyse states in Africa, and especially Somalia.

### AT: Heg

#### Hegemony is maintained by a farce of legitimacy which justifies endless destruction

Gulli 13**.** Bruno Gulli, professor of history, philosophy, and political science at Kingsborough College in New York, “For the critique of sovereignty and violence,” <http://academia.edu/2527260/For_the_Critique_of_Sovereignty_and_Violence>, pg. 5

I think that we have now an understanding of what the situation is: **The sovereign everywhere**, be it the political or financial elite, **fakes the legitimacy** on which its power and authority supposedly rest. In truth, they **rest on violence and terror**, or the threat thereof. This is an **obvious and essential aspect** of the singularity of the present crisis. In this sense, the singularity of the crisis lies in the fact that the struggle for dominance is at one and the same time impaired and made more brutal by **the lack of hegemony**. This is true in general, but it is perhaps particularly true with respect to the greatest power on earth, **the United States**, whose hegemony has **diminished or vanished**. It is a fortiori true of whatever is called ‘the West,’ of which the US has for about a century represented the vanguard. Lacking hegemony, the **sheer drive for domination** has to show **its true face**, its **raw violence**. The usual, traditional **ideological justifications for dominance** (such as bringing democracy and freedom here and there) have now become **very weak** because of **the contempt** that the dominant nations (the US and its most powerful allies) **regularly show** toward legality, morality, and humanity. Of course, the so-called rogue states, thriving on corruption, do not fare any better in this sense, but for them, when they act autonomously and against the dictates of ‘the West,’ the specter of punishment, in the form of retaliatory war or even indictment from the International Criminal Court, remains a clear limit, a possibility. **Not so for the dominant nations**: who will stop the United States from striking anywhere at will, or Israel from regularly massacring people in the Gaza Strip, or envious France from once again trying its luck in Africa? Yet, though still dominant, these nations are painfully aware of their **structural, ontological and historical, weakness**. All attempts at concealing that weakness (and the uncomfortable awareness of it) **only heighten the brutality** in the exertion of **what remains of their dominance**. Although they rely on a **highly sophisticated military machine** (the technology of drones is a clear instance of this) and on an equally sophisticated diplomacy, which has **traditionally** been and **increasingly** is an outpost for **military operations and global policing** (now excellently **incarnated by Africom**), **they know that they have lost their hegemony**.

### AT: Util

#### Utilitarian calculability justifies mass atrocity and turns its own end – it’s not inevitable

Weizman 11 (Eyal Weizman, professor of visual and spatial cultures at Goldsmiths, University of London, 2011, “The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza,” pp 8-10)

The theological origins of the lesser evil argument cast a long shadow on the present. In fact the idiom has become so deeply ingrained, and is invoked in such a staggeringly diverse set of contexts – from individual situational ethics and international relations, to attempts to govern the economics of violence in the context of the ‘war on terror’ and the efforts of human rights and humanitarian activists to manoeuvre through the paradoxes of aid – that it seems to have altogether taken the place previously reserved for the ‘good’. Moreover, the very evocation of the ‘good’ seems to everywhere invoke the utopian tragedies of modernity, in which evil seemed lurking in a horrible manichaeistic inversion. If no hope is offered in the future, all that remains is to insure ourselves against the risks that it poses, to moderate and lessen the collateral effects of necessary acts, and tend to those who have suffered as a result. In relation to the ‘war on terror,’ the terms of the lesser evil were most clearly and prominently articulated by former human rights scholar and leader of Canada’s Liberal Party Michael Ignatieff. In his book *The Lesser Evil*, Ignatieff suggested that in ‘balancing liberty against security’ liberal states establish mechanisms to regulate the breach of some human rights and legal norms, and allow their security services to engage in forms of extrajudicial violence – which he saw as lesser evils – in order to fend off or minimize potential greater evils, such as terror attacks on civilians of western states.11 If governments need to violate rights in a terrorist emergency, this should be done, he thought, only as an exception and according to a process of adversarial scrutiny. ‘Exceptions’, Ignatieff states, ‘do not destroy the rule but save it, provided that they are temporary, publicly justified, and deployed as a last resort.’12 The lesser evil emerges here as a pragmatist compromise, a ‘tolerated sin’ that functions as the very justification for the notion of exception. State violence in this model takes part in a necro-economy in which various types of destructive measure are weighed in a utilitarian fashion, not only in relation to the damage they produce, but to the harm they purportedly prevent and even in relation to the more brutal measures they may help restrain. In this logic, the problem of contemporary state violence resembles indeed an all-too-human version of the mathematical minimum problem of the divine calculations previously mentioned, one tasked with determining the smallest level of violence necessary to avert the greater harm. For the architects of contemporary war this balance is trapped between two poles: keeping violence at a low enough level to limit civilian suffering, and at a level high enough to bring a decisive end to the war and bring peace.13 More recent works by legal scholars and legal advisers to states and militaries have sought to extend the inherent elasticity of the system of legal exception proposed by Ignatieff into ways of rewriting the laws of armed conflict themselves.14 Lesser evil arguments are now used to defend anything from targeted assassinations and mercy killings, house demolitions, deportation, torture,15 to the use of (sometimes) non-lethal chemical weapons, the use of human shields, and even ‘the intentional targeting of some civilians if it could save more innocent lives than they cost.’16 In one of its more macabre moments it was suggested that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima might also be tolerated under the defence of the lesser evil. Faced with a humanitarian A-bomb, one might wonder what, in fact, might come under the definition of a greater evil. Perhaps it is time for the differential accounting of the lesser evil to replace the mechanical bureaucracy of the ‘banality of evil’ as the idiom to describe the most extreme manifestations of violence. Indeed, it is through this use of the lesser evil that societies that see themselves as democratic can maintain regimes of occupation and neo-colonization. Beyond state agents, those practitioners of lesser evils, as this book claims, must also include the members of independent nongovernmental organizations that make up the ecology of contemporary war and crisis zones. The lesser evil is the argument of the humanitarian agent that seeks military permission to provide medicines and aid in places where it is in fact the duty of the occupying military power to do so, thus saving the military limited resources. The lesser evil is often the justification of the military officer who attempts to administer life (and death) in an ‘enlightened’ manner; it is sometimes, too, the brief of the security contractor who introduces new and more efficient weapons and spatio-technological means of domination, and advertises them as ‘humanitarian technology’. In these cases the logic of the lesser evil opens up a thick political field of participation belonging together otherwise opposing fields of action, to the extent that it might obscure the fundamental moral differences between these various groups. But, even according to the terms of an economy of losses and gains, the conception of the lesser evil risks becoming counterproductive: less brutal measures are also those that may be more easily naturalized, accepted and tolerated – and hence more frequently used, with the result that a greater evil may be reached cumulatively, Such observations amongst other paradoxes are unpacked in one of the most powerful challenges to ideas such as Ignatieff’s – Adi Ophir’s philosophical essay *The Order of Evils*. In this book Ophir developed an ethical system that is similarly not grounded in a search for the ‘good’ but the systemic logic of an economy of violence – the possibility of a lesser means and the risk of more damage – but insists that questions of violence are forever unpredictable and will always escape the capacity to calculate them. Inherent in Ophir’s insistence on the necessity of calculating is, he posits, the impossibility of doing so. The demand of his ethics are grounded in this impossibility.17

### 2AC – Suffering K

**Ignoring images of suffering degrades ethics and legitimizes the worst violence**

1. Sontag, 3 (Susan, Peace Prize Recipient, Human Rights Activist And Internationally Renowned Author, Regarding the Pain of Others, p. 114-116)

To designate a hell is not, of course, to tell us anything about how to extract people from that hell, how to moderate hell's flames. Still, it seems a good in it­self to acknowledge, to have enlarged, one's sense of how much suffering caused by human wickedness there is in the world we share with others. Someone who is perennially surprised that depravity exists, who continues to feel disillusioned (even incredulous) when confronted with ev­idence of what humans are capable of inflicting in the way of gruesome, hands-on cruelties upon other humans, has not reached moral or psychological adulthood. **No one** after a certain age **has the right to** this kind of innocence, of superficiality, to this degree of **ignorance**, o**r amnesia**. There now exists a vast repository of images that make it harder to maintain this kind of moral defectiveness. Let the atrocious images haunt us. **Even if** they are **only to­kens**, and cannot possibly encompass most of the reality to which they refer, they still perform a vital function. The images say: This is what human beings are capable of doing-may volunteer to do, enthusiastically, self-righteously. **Don't forget**. This is not quite the same as asking people to remember a particularly monstrous bout of evil. ("Never forget.") Perhaps too much value is assigned to memory, not enough to thinking. Remembering is an ethical act, has ethical value in and of itself. Memory is, achingly, the only relation we can have with the dead. So the belief that remembering is an ethical act is deep in our natures as humans, who know we are going to die, and who mourn those who in the normal course of things die before us-grandparents, parents, teachers, and older friends. Heartlessness and amnesia seem to go together. But history gives contradictory signals about the value of remembering in the much longer span of a collective his­tory. There is simply too much injustice in the world. And too much remembering (of ancient grievances: Serbs, Irish) embitters. To make peace is to forget. To reconcile, it is necessary that memory be faulty and limited. If the goal is having some space in which to live one's own life, then it is desirable that the account of specific injustices dissolve into a more general understanding that human beings everywhere do terrible things to one another.

**Images of suffering are key to compassion**

**Porter, 6** – Prof & head of the School of International Studies at the University of South Australia, (Elisabeth, Hypatia 21.4, project muse)

I have explained what constitutes suffering and that attentiveness affirms dignity. I clarify further the nature of attentiveness. If morality is about our concerned responsiveness, attention is the prerequisite to intense regard. Iris Murdoch borrowed the concept of "attention" from Simone Weil "to express the idea of a just and loving gaze" (1985, 34) on the reality of particular persons. Part of the moral task is, as Murdoch reiterated, to see the world in its reality—to see people struggling in pain and despair. Weil, too, gave "attention" a prominent place, grounded in concrete matters of exploitation, economic injustice, and oppression.[23](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hypatia/v021/21.4porter.html#FOOT23) Her emphases were pragmatic in struggling against the debilitating nature of life—how "it humiliates, crushes, politicizes, demoralizes, and generally destroys the human spirit" (quoted in R. Bell 1998, 16)—and idealistic in striving to put ideals into practice. Too readily, we think about suffering in the height of media accounts of famine, suicide bombings, terrorist attacks, refugee camps, and war's destructive impact, and retreat quickly into our small world of self-pity. As Margaret Little explains, Murdoch's point was that "the seeing itself is a task—the task of being attentive to one's surroundings" (1995, 121). We need to "see" reality in order to imagine what it might be like for others, even when this includes horrific images from war violence.[24](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hypatia/v021/21.4porter.html#FOOT24) Yet despite the presence of embedded journalists, media reporting of such events as the invasion of Iraq has remained entirely typical in that "the experience of the people on the receiving end of this violence remains closed to us" (Manderson 2003, 4). Without political imagination, we will not have compassionate nations. "Without being tragic spectators, we will not have the insight required if we are to make life somewhat less tragic for those who . . . are hungry, and oppressed, and in pain" (Nussbaum 1996, 88). In order for political leaders to demonstrate [End Page 113] compassion, they should display the ability to imagine the lives led by members of the diverse groups that they themselves lead. Otherwise, dispassionate detachment predominates and acts like the 2003 invasion of Iraq lead to talk of freedom without seeing fear, assume liberation without replacing the losses, and abuse power without addressing people's pain. "The difference, for instance, between someone who discerns the painfulness of torture and someone who sees the *evil* of it is that the latter person has come to see the painfulness as a reason not to torture" (Little 1995, 126). Attentive ethics in international relations is about priorities and choices.

#### The alternative is silence and inaction which reinforces oppression and turns the critique

Blomley 94 (Nicholas K. Blomley – Professor of Geography at Simon Fraser University, 1994, “Activism and the Academy”, http://www.praxis-epress.org/CGR/CG\_Whole.pdf) //MD

So why the silence? Several reasons spring to mind. One likely option is that, for many, it is not an issue, given that many progressive academics seem to think that “activist” work is not **really** “intellectual” work. If people engage in “external” struggle, they do so “on their own time,” as citizens. Certainly this is something that tenure committees seem to believe. For example, my university carefully codes it as “community service” and weighs it as some small percentage of my total academic worth. That uncoupling of the categories “academic” and “activist” seems**, for me,**  difficult to sustain. I was struck by the view of one friend, who noted that she did not see herself as an academic occasionally engaged in activism, but **thought of herself** as an activist who happens to be an academic. It could also be said that such a distancing evades a special charge – what Noam Chomsky once termed the political “responsibility of intellectuals.” Intellectuals in the academy enjoy a special privilege that comes from political liberty, access to information, and freedom of expression. “For a privileged minority”, Chomsky (1969, 324) insists, “Western democracy provides the leisure, the facilities, and the training to seek the truth behind the veil of misrepresentation, ideology and class interest through which the events of current history are presented to us.” **To neglect that responsibility is,** at the very best, **to acquiesce to oppression.** There are more recent reasons for this self-silencing, perhaps, as we come to embrace a postmodern humility, and caution against speaking for the Other.Although such a prudence is laudable, it can also all too easily become a self-serving excuse for inaction. We certainly need to be alert to the perils of the academic colonization of community life, but we should also avoid any romantic assumptions of some authentically ‘pure’ field of activism. The activists I have encountered have all had complex, and occasionally self-serving, agendas. As we all occupy multiple subject positions, so activism is a field of contradiction and diversity.

### 2AC – FW

#### “Resolved” means to reduce through mental analysis

Random House Unabridged Dictionary, 6

(http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved)

Resolve: 1.To come to a definite or earnest decision about; determine (to do something): I have resolved that I shall live to the full. 2.to separate into constituent or elementary parts; break up; cause or disintegrate (usually fol. by into). 3.to reduce or convert by, or as by, breaking up or disintegration (usually fol. by to or into). 4.to convert or transform by any process (often used reflexively). 5.to reduce by mental analysis (often fol. by into).

#### The entirety of Western politics rests on the state of exception – any action that begins with the State maintains the ability to determine life

Agamben 98 – professor of philosophy at the University of Verona (Giorgio, Homo Sacer, pg. 8-9)

The protagonist of this book is bare life, that is, the life of *homo sacer* (sacred man), who *may be killed and yet not sacrificed,* and whose essential function in modern politics we intend to assert. An obscure figure of archaic Roman law, in which human life is included in the juridical order || *ordinamento* || solely in the form of its exclusion (that is, of its capacity to be killed), has thus offered the key by which not only the sacred texts of sovereignty but also the very codes of political power will unveil their mysteries. At the same time, however, this ancient meaning of the term sacer presents us with the enigma of a figure of the sacred that, before or beyond the religious, constitutes the first paradigm of the political realm of the West. The Foucauldian thesis will then have to be corrected or, at least, completed, in the sense that what characterizes modern politics is not so much the inclusion of zo~in rhepo/is—which is, in itself, absolutely ancient—nor simply the fact that life as such be­comes a principal object of the projections and calculations of State power. Instead the decisive fact is that, together with the process by which the exception everywhere becomes the rule, the realm of bare life—which is originally situated at the margins of the political order—gradually begins to coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoe right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction. At once exclud­ing bare life from and capturing it within the political order, the state of exception actually constituted, in its very separateness, the hidden foundation on which the entire political system rested. ‘When its borders begin to be blurred, the bare life that dwelt there frees itself in the city and becomes both subject and object of the conflicts of the political order, the one place for both the organiza­tion of State power and emancipation from it. Everything happens as if, along with the disciplinary process by which State power makes man as a living being into its own specific object, another process is set in motion that in large measure corresponds to the birth of modern democracy, in which man as a living being pres­ents himself no longer as an *object* but as the *subject* of political power. These processes—which in many ways oppose and (at least apparently) bitterly conflict with each other—nevertheless con­verge insofar as both concern the bare life of the citizen, the new biopolitical body of humanity.

#### Their politics leads to passivity

Antonio, 95 – Professor of Sociology at the University of Kansas (Robert J., “Nietzsche's Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History,” The American Journal of Sociology, 101.1, p. 14-15, 1995)

The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."' He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrications to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors—"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232-33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring net-works of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something.' `Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustio0n in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most mediocre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socrates, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to circumstances." Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely—a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience." The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

### AT: Decisionmaking

#### Their claims about portable skills rely on an understanding of education which frames subjects as units of rationality to be bettered through civilizing practices. This form of dispassionate subject construction eliminates care and dooms millions to suffering and death.

**Mourad, 1**

/Roger Jr., Director of Institutional Research at Washtenaw College and teaches at the University of Michigan. His academic credentials include a Ph.D. in Higher Education, M.A. in Philosophy of Education, and J.D. in Law, all from the University of Michigan. He is the author of *Postmodern Philosophical Critique and the Pursuit of Knowledge in Higher Education* ~Westport: Greenwood, 1997! and several recent journal publications on epistemological, ethical, and legal issues pertaining to the nature and structure of institutionally organized education and its relation to the social good, “Education After Foucault: The Question of Civility” *Teachers College Record Volume* 103, Number 5, October 2001, pp. 739–759/

EDUCATION FOR IMPROVEMENT, OR “KICKING THE DOG” Too many lost names too many rules to the game Better find a focus or you’re out of the picture.48 The idea that the fundamental issue of the just civil state is to find the right balance between preserving individual freedom and constraining individual threat has served as a tacit foundation within which belief and debate about educational philosophy, policy, and practice develop. This statement is not intended to suggest that there is some direct and specific historical connection that can be unequivocally demonstrated to exist between foundational political theory and mainstream educational theories and practices. However, I want to propose that there is a compatibility between them that has important consequences for a new critique of organized formal education. In the remainder of this paper, my aim is to argue that the tenor of the theories that I have summarized is endemic in the ordinary ways that we think about and engage in organized education. How is the idea of the basic human being that is posed as the fundamental social, political, and pedagogic problem for modern civilization, this human being that must be managed in order to keep it from harming itself and others, played out in educational presuppositions? The tacit, unchallenged belief is that through education, the human being must be made into something better than it was or would be absent a formal education. There are all kinds of versions of this subject and of what it should become: potential achiever, qualified professional, good citizen, “leader,” independent actor, critical thinker, change agent, knowledgeable person. In all cases, the subject before education is viewed to be, like the subject before civilization, something in need of being made competent—and safe—in the mind of the educator. From this vantage point, the pedagogic relationship between teacher and student, between competent adult and incompetent child ~or adult!, contains within it a possibility that it seeks to overcome, namely, a rejection of the socialization program of the former by the latter. There is an implicit conflict between individuals as soon as the student walks into the school or college classroom door from outside the civility that the teacher would have that student become. It must be resolved, or contained in some way; and this is done immediately by rendering the student a rule follower ~a follower of the social order!both in and out of the classroom. Or the student must be rendered a challenger of the social order, in favor of an order that overcomes oppression—to become a competent comrade. The individual must be taught how to be an individual in accordance with this balance. Being an individual means being “free”—it means being “self-determined,” it means competing, and it means obeying the law. This is the case, even if the teaching is done with kindness and sensitivity. The responsibility for dealing with suffering and limitation lies almost solely with this individual, not the state. In fact, if suffering is viewed at all, it tends to be viewed as something that is good for the individual to endure or to fight in order to overcome it. Limitation is not acknowledged, unless the individual is deemed disadvantaged in some way, and the remedy tends to be to provide the person with an opportunity to become competent. Is it any wonder that parents of children with disabilities, aided by many educators, often must fight for educational and other services? This situation simply reflects that the basic logic of organized formal education and, more generally, the state, is not predicated upon a recognition that the human being is susceptible to suffering or that the state’s reason for being should be to care for people. If caring for its inhabitants were the basic purpose of the civil state, then there would be no need to fight for this recognition. Is it any wonder that the education of the ordinary child is mainly training for a far-off, abstract future that is destined to be better than life at present? Why must school be about overcoming anything? We talk about equipping children and adults to “solve problems.” Yet, problems do not fall from the sky; they do not exist as such until a human being gives them a name. In contrast, the concept of contention suggests that the practical role of reason should be used to understand the human being as subject to suffering and to act accordingly as moral agents. That is very different from an educational philosophy, policy, and practice that views reason as an instrument by which to overcome obstacles and to conform to the social order. It may be argued that modern education is about reason, about how to think and live reasonably and, therefore, how to live well and to care for oneself and for others. Yet it is commonly expressed that we live in a “complex world” and that children and adults must “learn how to learn,” in order to “succeed in a world of rapid change.” The question that needs to be asked is: Why should a person have to? In effect, education expects the human being to have an unlimited ability to think and act with reason sufficient to cope with increasingly complex situations that require individual intellect to adequately recognize, evaluate, and prioritize alternative courses of action, consider their consequences, and make good decisions. For the most part, the increasing complexity of civil society and the multiplicity of factors that intellect is expected to deal with in different situations are not questioned in education. Is this what education is rightly about? Education is as much about the use of intelligence to avoid suffering and feelings of limitation and about fending off feelings of fear as it is about learning. It is about acting upon other people and upon the civil order to deal with perceived threats. One must be an “active learner” or else. Why? The individual must be acted upon and rendered into an entity that engages reality in the ways that are deemed just by many educators, lawmakers, and others with a stake in the perpetuation of the given social order. Thus, the individual is exhorted to “do your best,” “make an effort,” “earn a grade,” “be motivated,” “work hard,” “overcome obstacles,” “achieve.” Why should education be about any of these things? Unfortunately, the culture of scholarship is thoroughly consistent with these precepts. When we question them, we challenge the ends that they serve but not the ideas themselves. We believe that education is rightly about improvement. This philosophy of improvement is not necessarily consistent with enhancement of living. It often has the opposite effect. How is this result justified? Certainly, it can feel good to accomplish something or to overcome obstacles. Does that mean that adversity should be a positive value of the civil state? The modern idea, beginning with Descartes and established through Lockean empiricism ~and made pedagogic by Rousseau’s Emile!, that anyone can be rational leads quickly to the idea that everyone is responsible for being wholly rational, as that word is understood according to the social order. The perpetuation of the given social order in education as elsewhere is about gaining advantage and retaining power. It is about cultural politics and about marginalization of various groups and about class and about socializing children to believe in capitalism as if it is a natural law. Yet under the analysis that I have made here, these major problems are symptoms of something more basic. The more basic problem that I have emphasized here is inextricable from the problem of the just civil state. It is about the intense pressures on people to think and act in ways that serve broader interests that are not at all concerned with their well-being in a variety of contexts including psychological, social, economic, political, and cultural. It is no answer to ground pedagogy in the notion of “building community.” The idea that something must be built implies that something must be made better in order for it to be tolerated. Moreover, “community” carries with it the prerequisite that one be made competent to be a member— again, the presumption that something must be done to the person to make it better in some way. I do not mean to say that educators have bad intent. I do mean that this ethos of betterment through competency will inevitably fail to fulfill the dreams of reformers and revolutionaries. It does not consider the human being as an entity to care for but rather as something to be equipped with skills and knowledge in order to improve itself. This failure is not only because there are millions of children and adults that live in poverty in the wealthiest countries in human history. It is because the state of mind that can tolerate such suffering is the same state that advances and maintains the ethos of civility as betterment, rather than civility as caring for people because they are subject to suffering. The alternative that I have only introduced in a very abbreviated way under the rubric that I called “contention” is intended to be pragmatic in the ways that Foucault and Richard Rorty are pragmatic in their respective approaches to the subject of the state.49 It is intended to address an unacceptable state of contemporary Western civilization, namely, its repetitive and even escalating incidence of disregard for suffering and harm in many forms, despite intellectual, social, medical, legal, educational, scientific, and technological “progress.” We have had two hundred years of modern educational principles, and two hundred years of profound suffering along with them. The problem of the individual calls for a new formulation and for a proper response—one that cares for the individual rather than makes it competent. The “modern project” of betterment through competency and opportunity must be challenged and replaced by an emotionally intelligent ethos that expressly and fundamentally acknowledges suffering and limitation in philosophy, policy, and practice.

## 1AR

### Discourse Shapes Reality

Theoretical thinking concerning security problematizes militarized practices like the “war on drugs” – it constitutes reality

**Bilgin, 5** – Professor of IR, Bikent University, *Regional Security In The Middle East A Critical Perspective*, Page 7

From a critical perspective, thinking differently about security involves: first, challenging the ways in which security has traditionally been conceptualised by broadening and deepening the concept and by rejecting the primacy given to the sovereign state as the primary referent for, and agent of, security. Critical approaches also problematise the **militarised** and zero-sum practices informed by prevailing discourses and call for reconceptualising practice. Second, thinking differently entails rejecting the conception of theory as a neutral tool, which merely explains social phenomena, and emphasises the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice. That is, the way we (the community of students of security) think and write about security informs practice; it privileges certain practices whilst marginalising others, thereby helping **constitute** what human beings choose to call **'reality'**. Theory is itself a form of practice; theorising is recognised as a political activity. Finally, adopting a critical approach to security implies adopting an explicitly normative (for some, emancipation-oriented) approach to security in theory and practice.

### SSD

Bracketing off of our protest is enabled by the state of exception and legitimizes brutal cycles of governmentality – turns switch-side

Elmer and Opel, 8 (Greg Elmer, associate professor of communication and culture at Ryerson University, PhD in communication from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, director of the Infoscape Research Lab at Ryerson University, Andy Opel, associate professor of communication at Florida State University, PhD in mass communication from the University of North Carolina, member of the International Communication Association, November 2008, “Preempting Dissent: The Politics of an Inevitable Future,” pages 29-41)

SHORTLY AFTER THE LARGE-SCALE PROTESTS against the World Trade Organization in Seattle in late November 1999, police, law enforcement agencies, the military, and global weapons manufacturers began to rethink their responses to public protests. Since the Seattle protests, similar semi—annual gatherings of government officials and corporate trade lawyers have consistently attracted large public protests, organized by public-interests groups denied participation in the decision-making process of trade agreements such as the Global Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Wide—scale protests were seen in Prague, Genoa, Cancun, Quebec City, Miami, and, most recently, Mar Del Plata, Argentina. Moreover, as we will see in this chapter, as the size and sophistication of resistance grew, so too did political and legal responses to that resistance. Responses to such protests have been greatly influenced by military and so—called ‘homeland’ security strategies enacted after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the initiation of the controversial second Gulf War. As we see in this chapter, the combination of a changing political climate in response to war and terrorism, particularly the expansion of preemptive forms of social control and political containment, has resulted in a new set of practices that have reconfigured public space and criminalized multiple aspects of free speech and public assembly in the United States. This chapter argues that in the shadow of 9/11, the war in Iraq, and the ongoing “War on Terror,” a disturbing form of geopolitical apartheid has emerged in the United States. At the core of this trend is a set of micro-political strategies and technologies that attempt to contain spaces of dissent and detain protestors (Boghosian, 2004). Some activists and critics have labeled these anti-democratic tendencies the “Miami Model,” after the strategies deployed in November 2003 against Free Trade of the Americas protestors by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies stationed in Miami. The Miami model of law enforcement was characterized by 1) the deployment of overwhelming numbers of law enforcement officers, 2) preemptive arrests of peaceful and law—abiding protestors, and 3) widespread police surveillance techniques before, during, and after protests (Getzan, 2004). And while these three pillars—overwhelming force, preemptive arrests, and surveillance—-provide a good overview of police and law enforcement strategies, in this chapter we focus on the manner in which spaces of dissent, debate, and democracy are being regulated and policed through the courts, going into more depth in the next chapter, through a study of the introduction of weapons meant to easily contain and detain protestors and, more broadly, immobilize dissent. Of greater concern is the degree to which such strategies systematically marginalize dissent, spatially and politically speaking. From the creation of “free speech zones” and the proposal for protest free “Pedestrian Safety Zones”2° to the political screening of participants in political “town hall meetings,” space has increasingly become a tool to limit open debate, freedom of speech, and political dissent

in the US.Part of our interest in exposing the strategies of political segregation, first through the containment of protest spaces, and second, through the deployment of preemptive hand-held weapons, is theoretical. The segregation of deviance has often been influenced by Foucaultian theories of panopticism and social control. An increasing number of scholars, however, are arguing that Foucault’s panoptic prison, even deployed in metaphorical terms, has been overextended, particularly when considering broader geographic perspectives (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000; Elmer, 2004). Many scholars arguing that panopticism must move beyond architectures or institutions of social control, do so in large part to theorize emerging technological, “virtual,” or simulated forms of surveillance and discipline (e.g., Bogard; Gandy). While we find such arguments to be productive, they typically juxtapose their ideas against corporeal surveillance and monitoring of the past. Human surveillance and policing factors, conversely, play a key role in monitoring political organizing activities and training, peaceful protests, and acts of civil disobedience (Boghosian, 2004, p. 29). Moreover, Foucault’s metaphorical use of a penitentiary as the historical trope or dispositif for social discipline, reformation, and self-actualization, while providing a broad conceptual framework for a dispersed theory of self-discipline, control, and conformity, has little to say about that which escapes conformity, namely public protest, civil disobedience, and other forms of social and political dissent. Under the constant gaze of social mores and values, Foucault’s subjects are implored to change and police their own behaviour. The proliferation of surveillance technologies (such as closed-circuit TV, CCTV), preemptive policing, programs that attempt to anticipate future social and geopolitical risks (Elmer Opel, 2006), and the presumption of guilt instead of innocence, are in part a response to past intelligence failures. The inability to gain adequate and up-to-date intelligence on domestic and international risks in the US, UK, Iraq, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, etc., continues to highlight the limits and shortcomings of surveillance programs and intelligence—gathering techniques. The recognition of decentred and distributed network infrastructures and relationships among protesters, migrants, and terrorists in the US and elsewhere, has similarly stretched conventional thinking about the structure and deployment of surveillance programs and technologies. In short, members of such feared networks are not typically considered panoptic subjects, that is to say, they are not clients, candidates, or inmates in need of reform, or self-discipline. Rather, it is argued that such networked subjects have become increasingly influenced by strategic and indefinite forms of containment and detainment. Didier Bigo’s (2006) extension of Foucault’s theories of social control provides a helpful point of departure. While Bigo shares the goal of extending theories of social and political control outside of the prison and other social institutions, he maintains an interest in the social control of populations, specifically through the mobility, capture, and detainment of specific populations. By introducing the concept of the “ban-opticon,” Bigo succeeds in moving outside the panoptic walls of punishment, to question the optics and governmentality of indefinite detainment, a questionable spatial and legal tactic used in the “War on Terror” and with migrant communities. Such detainees, be they in Guantanamo Bay or in immigrant holding centres in the EU and elsewhere, have no intention of turning their subjects into law-abiding, productive citizens (Miller, 1993), rather their goal is both to remove individuals from war, or to merely return them to their previous location—to ban them. In both cases, individuals are immobilized and excluded from participating in war and/ or entering Western societies. Although political protestors produce a different set of challenges from domestic law enforcement and forces of political control in the US—primarily their visibility in the media as increased evidence of opposition to the political status quo—they are similarly immobilized, contained, and in some cases detained without charge. Such detainments, further, in many instances are not subject to punishment (fines, etc.); rather, they are increasingly used to preemptively, and temporarily remove protestors from public spaces until the conclusion of protests (Boghosian, 2004, p. 29). The operationalization of preemptive tactics in the US further highlights the limitations of Foucault’s decentred model of power, in which sovereignty is manifest through dispersed disciplinary technologies. Strategies of political containment and detainment, spatially and individually speaking, are in large part enabled by what Gieorgio Agamben (2005) refers to as the “state of exception,” the “no man’s land between public law and political fact” (p. 1). Ironically, while conservatives in the US continue to argue against a “living constitution,” where interpretations over the nation’s law change over time,21 the Bush administration actively sought to reinterpret executive powers during the so-called War on Terror. Following Agamben, Didier Bigo (2006) argues that such interpretations are enacted through explicit declarations by political rulers, a declaration that invokes an exception to the rule of law. Broadly construed, the US administration continues to invoke the War on Terror to blur the line between law and politics. In defence of the secret wiretapping program, the Bush administration has argued that an exception to the rule of law was enacted by the legislation, giving the president preemptive powers to carry out surveillance. Similar arguments have been made in the UK, Canada, and France. The Boston Globe and other media in the US also reported about the growing use of “signing statements” by the US president, as a means to state his exception to the new law. For example, after the signing of US Senator John McCain’s anti—torture bill in the January 2006, the president declared that “The executive branch shall construe [the law] in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President as Commander in Chief.” He also added that this interpretation “will assist in achieving the shared objective of the Congress and the President ... of protecting the American people from further terrorist attacks” (Savage, 2004). Of course, many American laws that govern executive power, public debate, and, as we see next, dissent and protest in public space, are so broadly written that they practically cultivate political exceptionalism. For example, as an adjunct to debates over the US Patriot Act, the “spatial tactics” of law enforcement have recently produced a series of controversial rulings about the accessibility of public spaces for the purposes of political protest. Thus, at a time when public advocates and intellectuals have reinforced the importance of understanding the democratic and political aspects of various geographies——most notably innovative and tolerant ones (Florida, 2003) and environmentally sustainable ones (Gore, 2007)—the American legal system continues to downplay or altogether avoid spatial considerations in First Amendment cases. Timothy Zick (2005), for example, argues that “The reason courts fail to properly scrutinize spatial tactics is that they have accepted the common conception of place as mere res—a neutral thing, an undifferentiated mass, a backdrop for expressive scenes” (p. 3). Results of this legal conception of place as a “neutral thing” include the protest zones (some resembling cages”) established at both the Democratic and Republican national conventions during the summer of 2004 as well as the now routine practice of keeping protestors many blocks and often miles away from free trade, WTO, or GATT meetings. Later in the same year the G8 summit was held on the tiny (private) Sea Island, just off the coast near Savannah, Georgia, a choice that made it nearly impossible——given the security noose around the island——to stage a meaningful and visible protest. In South Carolina, the well-known activist Brett Bursey gained nationwide attention for a series of attempts to protest against President Bush at Republican Party organized rallies, the last of which, in 2004, resulted in his arrest and conviction under a statute that enables the Secret Security to establish a security perimeter or zone around the president. Mirroring Zick’s argument about the court’s treatment of space as an objective or neutral equation in contemporary politics, an aide to the former South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond, was quoted on National Public Radio as saying that: The statute under which Mr. Bursey’s been charged alleges that he failed to vacate an area that had been cordoned off for a visit by the president of the United States. It is a content—neutral statute, and Mr. Bursey is charged not because of what he was doing but because of where he was doing it. The US statute in question—-USC 18: 1 752(a)(l)(ii), “Temporary residences and offices of the President and others”—while not a new, post-9/11 law, nevertheless raises obvious questions and concerns about its use as a political tool for spatially and politically marginalizing dissent. The law in effect establishes a temporary “residence” for the president as he goes about his business across the country. The law forbids groups or individuals from entering or remaining with an area (defined as “building,” “grounds,” or “any posted, cordoned off. . .” area where the president is visiting).24 Moreover, the law does not apply universally, only to those who intend “to impede or disrupt the orderly conduct of Government business or official functions.” Interestingly, in the course of preparing Bursey’s defence, lawyers were able to gain access to the Secret Service’s policy manual on protests. The South Carolina Progressive Network subsequently used the document to highlight the means by which the Bush administration was interpreting the above mentioned law to segregate protestors away from the president’s supporters and the media. Moreover, The Progressive Network also maintained that while the law did give the Secret Service the power to cordon off access to the president, “There is no limitation to the size of the restricted area.” Furthermore, “In the Bursey case, the restricted area was approximately 70 acres and stretched for a mile.”25 With no spatial limits on the separation of protestors from the US president, political marginalization becomes a distinct possibility. The spatial segregation of speakers according to the content of their messages all too easily bifurcates voices and perspectives into “two sides,” mirroring the dominant red/ blue political culture of the US. Thus in the absence of political leaders, protests, and, perhaps more importantly, acts of civil disobedience, lose their publicity, all too often becoming marginalized spectacles distanced from the machinations of political parties, candidates, and government. Zick put it this way: “In these places, protests and demonstrations become staged events, bland and neutered substitutions for the passionate and, yes, sometimes chaotic face-to—face confrontations that have characterized our country’s past” (Zick, 2005, p. 45). The process of segregating public space according to political message and turning public gatherings into “staged events” is contrasted with the actual political strategy of the staged event or “town hall meeting,” where pre-screened publics appear to ask government officials “authentic” questions, a practice that has many online examples as well.26 This illusion of public participation is another quality of the spatial turn in free speech politics where city streets are cordoned off to become de facto “stages” for media cameras. By literally separating the demonstrators from the object of their demonstration, the protest zone becomes “a way of controlling the content of the debate without really acknowledging that is what is being done” (Mitchell, 2003, p. 39). In addition to creating media frames and stages, protest zoning also facilitates preemptive police tactics, placing all potential protestors in one location in the name of security. Fencing in protestors or zoning them away from a given site implies a threat or danger that requires preemptive zoning, thus “assuming guilt until innocence is proven” (Mitchell, 2003, p. 39). Mitchell refers to this zoning as the “ghettoization” of protest; we prefer the South African analogy of an apartheid as more accurate. Whereas a ghetto is often viewed as the result of low-income people clustered together out of necessity and a lack of resources, apartheid was an explicit legal and spatial strategy that segregated settlements and produced a second-class citizenry. Parallels can be drawn to the state of liberal democracy in the United States, where protestors and political dissidents are legally restrained and contained outside of the so-called mainstream political stage. Yet, as we will see in the next chapter, preemptive arrests, facilitated by segregationist spatial tactics and exceptionalist forms of governmentality, often move beyond the realm of the panoptic to the violent repressive use of weaponry, what are creatively termed “less-lethal technologies.” As we shall see, many new crowd control technologies have incorporated decidedly preemptive logics that explicitly reinforce our belief that the preemptive doctrine is as much about controlling behaviours and seeking broader political compliance as it is a technique for reducing actual risks and dangers.